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COMMENT
THE CONCEPT OF DEFECT IN AMERICAN
AND ENGLISH PRODUCTS LIABILITY
DISCOURSE:
DESPITE STRICT LIABILITY
LINGUISTICS, NEGLIGENCE IS BACK
WITH A VENGEANCE!,
The enthusiastic adoption of § 402A by the majority of ju-
risdictions unleashed a rich and diverse body of case law unri-
valed anywhere. 2 The abstract, and to a great extent unclear,
formulation of § 402A is out-dated. A restatement of products
liability law, therefore, is welcome. 3 The Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability (Proposed Final Draft) (April 1, 1997)4
recognizes that the present day strict products liability regime
has caused much confusion. In particular, the Restatement
1 Most commentators agree that the concept of defectiveness is the pulp of
products liability. Marshall Shapo, for example, intimates that, "[tihe way we
speak about the defect concept has implications across a broad spectrum of
jurisprudence." See Marshall S. Shapo, A New Legislation: Remarks on the Draft
Restatement of Products Liability, 30 U. MICH J. L. REFORM 215, 216 (1997). David
G. Owen, insists that the first two sections of the Restatement (Third), which deal
with the concept of defect, are the "heart and soul of the Third Restatement."
David G. Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the "Strict" Products Liability
Myth, 1996 U. ILL L. REV 743, 746. Alistair M. Clark states that "defectiveness is
the basis of any claim." ALISTAIR M. CLARK, PRODUCT LIABILITY 5 (1989)
[hereinafter CLARK].
2 A recent search in WESTLAW's Federal and States case database, con-
ducted by the author, retrieved almost 3,800 cases citing the RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TORTS § 402A.
3 A small minority of products liability commentators argue that the subject
of products liability is "ill-suited to restatement." Anita Bernstein, Restatement
Redux: Product Liability by Jane Stapleton, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1663, 1678 (1995)
(book review) (insisting that "products liability, somewhat amenable to restate-
ment in the past, now resists reconciliation and centralized improvements").
4 The American Law Institute adopted the Proposed Final Draft (April 1,
1997) with minor changes on May 20, 1997 [hereinafter Restatement (Third)].
275
1
PACE INT'L L. REV.
(Third) views, as a misnomer, the notion that strict liability ap-
plied to design and warning defects. With this said, what is the
appropriate standard in design and inadequate warning de-
fects? The answer does not lie in an abstract re-formulation but
rather lies in the judicial application of a standard that results
in a fair and equitable balance between consumer interests and
manufacturer interests. Did the Restatement (Third) achieve
this golden mean? It does not appear to have done so, only with
judicial application will we know for certain.
It is no secret that American products liability law is re-
treating back to negligence. In England, however, products lia-
bility law is embracing the so-called American brand of strict
liability. The objective of this comparative study is twofold.
First, given that the American products liability regime has
more experience than its English counterpart, American prod-
ucts liability developments might define and forecast the trend
of English products liability. Second, because England is the
cradle of the common law, English products liability develop-
ments may be relevant to the American experience.
This paper consists of five parts. Part one surveys the
evolution of products liability law in the United States from
Winterbottom to § 402A. Part two surveys the evolution of rele-
vant English law from Winterbottom to 1987. Part three in-
cludes a case analysis between English law prior to 1987, and
American law prior to the Restatement (Third); the analysis
pertains to manufacturing, design, and inadequate warning de-
fects, concluding that only minor differences existed between
both systems. Part four analyzes the Restatement (Third) and
surveys the scholarly response. Part five analyzes the U.K. Con-
sumer Protection Act 1987 Part I, with the Restatement (Third)
in the background. Finally, part five finds that the products lia-
bility regime in the United States and in England is negligence
based, yet couched in strict liability terminology, or strict liabil-
ity linguistics.
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I. UNITED STATES
(A) The Beginning: Winterbottom v. Wright
Although it is not a products liability case, Winterbottom v.
Wright5 is the best starting point to examine the evolution of
products liability in both the United Kingdom and the United
States.6 In Winterbottom, the plaintiff, a coachman, was injured
as the result of the defendant's failure to maintain the coach.7
The defendant was a contractor in charge of maintaining
coaches for a stagecoach company." Lord Abinger concluded
that liability would not attach to the contractor because "[tihere
[was] no privity of contract between these parties."9
Both U.S. and U.K. courts extended the Winterbottom priv-
ity rule to products liability cases. 10 Winterbottom came to
stand for the proposition that plaintiffs injured by a defective
product could only maintain a cause of action in negligence or
warranty if there was privity of contract.'1
(B) Thomas v. Winchester: the beginning of the end of
Winterbottom
Numerous exceptions to the Winterbottom rule evolved.' 2
In 1852, the earliest exception to the rigid Winterbottom-privity
5 10 M. & W. 109, 11 L.J. Ex. 415 (1842).
6 Its impact on products liability has been recognized by commentators. Jerry
Phillips' case book on products liability takes Winterbottom as the point of depar-
ture in the evolution of products liability. JERRY J. PHILLIPS, NICHOLAS P. TERRY &
FRANK J. VANDALL, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: CASES, MATERIAL, PROBLEMS (1994).
7 11 L.J. Ex. 415.
8 See id.
9 Id. at 417.
10 Discussing privity, Cardozo elaborated, "[iun England the limits of the rule
are still unsettled. Winterbottom v. Wright is often cited." Macpherson v. Buick,
111 N.E. 1050, 1054 (1916). See also 1 M. STUART MADDEN § 1.2, p. 8 (2d ed. 1988);
JANE STAPLETON, PRODUCT LIABILITY at 17 (1993).
11 See PHILLIPS, TERRY, & VANDALL, supra note 6, at 1-2.
12 See Cornelius W. Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 OR. L. REV.
119 (1958) (observing that "almost as soon as the privity rule was (supposedly)
formulated, the courts began to emasculate it with exceptions"). Gillam discerned
29 exceptions to the privity rule:
(1) The retailer is the consumer's agent to buy; (2) the retailer is the man-
ufacturer's agent to sell; (3) the retailer assigns his warranty from the
manufacturer to the consumer; (4) the consumer is a third-party benefici-
ary of the retailer's contract with the manufacturer; (5) the manufac-
turer's marketing of the goods is an offer to the consumer to warrant them
if he will buy; (6) the manufacturer makes a unilateral offer to the con-
3
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rule came in the New York Court of Appeals' decision in
Thomas v. Winchester.13 In Thomas, the plaintiff consulted a
physician about an illness. The physician prescribed medicine
for her. The plaintiff took a dose of the medicine and then be-
came extremely ill suffering from "feebleness of circulation,
spasms of the muscles, giddiness of the head, dilation of the
pupils of the eyes, and derangement of mind."14 Fortunately,
she recovered; however, the plaintiff eventually learned that
the medicine was mislabeled and contained a deadly poison. 15
Acknowledging that injury was not likely to fall on the
dealer who purchased the drug from a manufacturer, but "more
likely to be visited on a remote purchaser," the court found that
"[tihe defendant's negligence put human life in imminent dan-
ger."16 The court held that where life is put in imminent danger,
"the party guilty of the negligence is liable to the party injured,
sumer; (7) the manufacturer's marketing of the goods is a representation
to the consumer that they are fit to buy; (8) the defendant is unable to
overcome the inference of negligence from circumstantial evidence; (9)
there is irrebuttable "presumption" of negligence; (10) a warranty "runs
with the goods" from the manufacturer to the consumer; (11) the manufac-
turer's warranty to the retailer "insures to the consumer's benefit;" (12) a
warranty runs with food from the manufacturer to the consumer, but not
with a food container; (13) pure-food statutes makes the manufacturer a
guarantor of his product as to consumers; (14) warranty is confused with
negligence; (15) food cases are a special exception to the privity rule; (16)
the privity rule is repudiated as contrary to public policy; (17) the privity
rule is simply rejected; (18) the privity rule is simply ignored; (19) breach
of implied warranty is a tort; (20) section 15(1) of the Uniforms Sales Act
abolishes the privity requirement; (21) section 15(2) of the Uniform Sales
Act includes the consumer as a "buyer;" (22) Section 15(2) of the Uniform
Sales Act includes the manufacturer as a "seller;" (23) Section 15(2) of the
Uniform Sales Act extends the implied warranty of fitness for a general
purpose to the consumer; (24) implied sidesteps the privity requirement;
(25) notice and opportunity to defend make adverse findings against the
defendant retailer binding on the manufacturer against whom the retailer
has a claim over; (26) the manufacturer's advertising is an express war-
ranty to the consumer; (27) the manufacturer's advertising is a negligent
express representation to the consumer; (28) the manufacturer's advertis-
ing is a deceit; (29) the manufacturer is estopped from denying that he has
made representations to the consumer.
Id. at 154-155.
13 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
14 Id. at 405.
15 See id.
16 Id. at 409.
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whether there be a contract between them or not."17 Subse-
quently, numerous other exceptions to the privity rule emerged,
and as one commentator correctly observed, "eventually the ex-
ceptions swallowed the rule."1 8
(C) Macpherson v. Buick: The End of Winterbottom:
In 1916, Judge Cardozo hammered in the final nail in the
Winterbottom coffin. In Macpherson v. Buick,' 9 the defendant, a
car manufacturer, sold a car to a car dealer who then sold it to
plaintiff. Plaintiff was injured when the car "suddenly col-
lapsed. ' 20 Apparently one of the car's wheels was made of defec-
tive wood, and its "spokes crumbled into fragments." 21 Judge
Cardozo summarized the issue in the dispute as follows: "The
question to be determined is whether the defendant owed a
duty of care and vigilance to any one but the immediate pur-
chaser."22 Sifting through case law and relying upon the cele-
brated Winchester exception, Cardozo held that,
Thomas v. Winchester is not limited to poisons, explosives, and
things of like nature, to things which in their normal operation
are implements of destruction. If the nature of a thing is such that
it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negli-
gently made, it is then a thing of danger. Its nature gives warning
of the consequences to be expected. If to the element of danger
there is added knowledge that the thing will be used by persons
other than the purchaser ... irrespective of contract, the manu-
facturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it
carefully. 23
The Winterbottom "bastard offspring"24 that "plagued the law
for four generations" were once and for all laid to rest.25 In
17 Id. at 410.
18 PHILLIPS, TERRY, & VANDALL, supra note 6, at 2; see also Gillam, supra note
12, at 134 (stating that "[ulitimantley the exception became the rule").
19 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
20 Id. at 1051.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 1053.
24 Lester W. Freezer, Tort Liability of Manufacturers & Vendors, 10 MINN L.
REV. 1, 3 (1925) cited in Gillam, supra note 12, at 134.
25 Gillam, supra note 12, at 134.
279
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short, as stated by Cardozo, a manufacturer owes a duty of care
to foreseeable users irrespective of privity.
(D) The Strict Liability Seeds Planted: Escola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Company
Although a plaintiff need not be in privity to maintain an
action in products liability, they must prove the manufacturer
breached their duty of due care, i.e., that the manufacturer was
at fault. This requirement was not easily proven. Recognizing
the difficulty this requirement was causing, the courts began to
construe res ipsa loquitur liberally. This approach was illus-
trated in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.26 In that case plain-
tiff, a waitress in a restaurant, was injured when a bottle of coca
cola exploded in her hand.27 Plaintiff recovered a jury verdict,
and on appeal, the court affirmed, holding that res ipsa loquitur
applied, relieving the plaintiff from the burden of proving that
defendant was negligent.28 The court found no direct evidence
of negligence on the part of the retailer, nor that the defendant
manufacturer was negligent in manufacturing the bottle or in
preparing the beverage; yet, the court found sufficient circum-
stantial evidence to satisfy the requirements "necessary to enti-
tle plaintiff to rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to supply
an inference of negligence .... ,,29
The Escola decision is not known for its res ipsa loquitur
application, but rather for Justice Traynor's famous concurring
opinion that planted the seeds for strict products liability. "I
concur in the judgment[,]" asserted Traynor, "but I believe the
manufacturer's negligence should no longer be singled out as
the basis of a plaintiffs right to recover in cases like the present
one."30 Judge Traynor desired a standard which would hold a
manufacturer, absolutely liable "when an article that he has
placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used without in-
spection, proves to have a defect that causes injury to human
beings."3 1
26 50 P.2d 436 (1944).
27 See id. at 437.
28 See id. at 439.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 440.
31 50 P.2d at 440.
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(E) Greenman v Yuba Power Products: the strict liability
seed bears fruit
Nineteen years later, the Supreme Court of California
adopted Traynor's concurrence. In Greenman v. Yuba Power
Product, Inc.,32 plaintiffs wife purchased a power tool for plain-
tiff. While using the machine, a piece of wood flew out, and
struck plaintiff on the forehead injuring him.3 3 Writing for the
majority, Justice Traynor held that "[a] manufacturer is strictly
liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing
that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to
have a defect that causes injury to a human being."34 With this
elucidation, modern strict products liability law was born. Jus-
tice Traynor elaborated that though strict liability was initially
restricted to food-stuffs, the rule has been extended to many
other situations.3 5 The seminal nature of Greenman lies in its
announcement that liability in cases of product defect "is not
one governed by the law of contract warranties but by the law of
strict liability in tort."36
(F) The Triumph of Strict Liability: § 402A
While the judicial evolution in products liability was taking
its natural common law course, the American Law Institute37
was considering a Second Restatement of Torts. In 1954, the
task of drafting the Second Restatement of Torts was assigned
to William L. Prosser.38 It was no secret that Prosser was a
strong advocate of strict products liability. In a highly influen-
32 377 P.2d 897 (1963).
33 See id. at 897.
34 Id. at P.2d at 900.
35 See id. at 901.
36 Id.
37 In 1923, The Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent Organiza-
tion for the Improvement of the Law, a group composed of judges, lawyers and law
professors, concluded that American Law had two flaws - its uncertainty and its
complexity. The Committee recommended that a lawyer's organization be estab-
lished to improve American law. Thus, the American Law Institute [hereinafter
ALI] was born. ALI's charter stated that its main purpose was "to promote the
clarification and simplification of the law and its better adaptation to social needs,
to secure the better administration of justice, and to encourage and carry on schol-
arly and scientific legal work." American Law Institute, About the American Law
Institute, (visited Jan. 22, 1998) <http://www.ali.org/ali/thisali.htm>.
38 See Herbert Wechsler, Introduction to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS AT
viii (1965).
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tial article, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), Prosser, with great enthusiasm and a bit of prece-
dent exaggeration, vehemently advocated a strict liability re-
gime for products injures.39 Suggesting that the time had come
for the adoption of strict liability, Prosser explained, "[t]here is
nothing so shocking about it today that cannot be accepted and
stand on its own feet in this new and additional field, provided
always that public sentiment, public demand, and 'public policy'
have reached the point where the change is called for."40 With
the Greenman decision at his side, Prosser was able to include a
strict liability scheme into the Restatement (Second), which was
subsequently adopted by ALI in 1964.41 Section 402A provides
that a seller is liable to the "ultimate user or consumer" for in-
jury caused by his product that is "in a defective condition un-
reasonably dangerous." 42
Although decided prior to the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, Greenman and § 402A advocate the same black letter
law.43 Immediately after the publication of § 402A, many juris-
39 Prosser contended that "strict liability in food cases, without privity is the
present law of a clear majority of the jurisdictions;" and that strict liability has
gone beyond foodstuff to include products ranging from hair dye to tires. William
L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
YALE L.J. 1099, 1110-1112 (1960). This, according to Prosser, revealed that "the
definite impression that the dam has busted, and those in the path of the ava-
lanche would do well to make for the hills." Id. at 1113.
40 Id. at 1134.
41 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). It is interesting to
note that during drafting, § 402A was subject to three revisions: first, § 402A was
applicable only to foodstuff, second, it was extended to include "products for inti-
mate bodily use[,]" and finally, as applicable to all products. See WILLIAM L. PRos-
SER & JOHN W. WADE, TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 707 (5th ed. 1971).
42 (1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably danger-
ous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substan-
tial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the sellers.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
43 There are two minor differences between the Greenman rule and § 402A:
(1) unlike § 402A, Greenman required that the manufacturer know that the prod-
uct would be used without inspection; and (2) unlike Greenman, § 402A allowed, in
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol10/iss1/11
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dictions throughout the country either adopted § 402A, or a
Greenman type strict liability rule. Never in the history of ALI
Restatements has a section received such pervasive adoption
among the jurisdictions. 44
II. UNITED KINGDOM.
(A) The Death of Winterbottom: Donoghue v. Stevenson
Like the United States, English products liability law was
based on Winterbottom v. Wright. Prior to 1932, English law
recognized a duty of care to users or consumers in two situa-
tions: (1) where an article was dangerous in-and-of itself; and
(2) where an article was in fact dangerous due "to a defect or
any other reason, and this was known to the manufacturer."45
Unlike the in United States, Winterbottom survived in England
with minor exceptions for almost a century. 46
In 1932, the House of Lords overruled Winterbottom's priv-
ity rule in Donoghue v. Stevenson.47 In that case, plaintiff was
drinking a ginger beer ice cream float, purchased at a tavern by
a friend, when the remains of a decomposed snail floated out of
the bottle. 48 In a major departure from precedent, the court held
the manufacturer liable notwithstanding the lack of privity.49
Lord Atkin stated that:
the absence of personal injury, recovery for loss of property other than the defec-
tive product. See MADDEN, supra note 10, § 6.1, at 192.
44 See Owen, supra note 1, at 744 (lamenting that '[ilf ever a Restatement
reformulation of the law were accepted uncritically as divine, surely it is section
402A of the Second Restatement of Torts"); Philip H. Corboy, The Not-So-Quiet
Revolution: Rebuilding Barriers to Jury Trial in the Proposed Restatement (Third)
of Torts: Products Liability, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1043, 1051 (1994).
45 CLARK, supra note 1, at 5.
46 See GERAINT G. HOWELLS, COMPARATIVE PRODUCTS LIABILITY 69-70 (1993)
(explaining that in addition to recognizing that "articles dangerous in themselves"
as an exception to Winterbottom, the British courts recognized liability in cases
where the manufacturer knew of product dangers, yet did nothing to prevent in-
jury); see also Lord Griffiths, Peter De Val & R.J. Dormer, Developments in English
Product Liability Law: A Comparison With the American System, 62 TUL. L. REV.
353, 357 (pointing out there were two exceptions to the general privity rule (1) in
the case where an article is dangerous in and of itself; and (2) where the defect was
known to the manufacturer).
47 1932 App. Cas. 562 (appeal taken from Scot.).
48 See id.
49 Lord Atkin: "I don't think so ill of our jurisprudence as to suppose that its
principles are so remote from the ordinary needs of civilized society and the ordi-
9
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[A] manufacturer of products which he sells in such a form as to
show that he intends for it to reach the ultimate consumer in the
form in which they left him, with no reasonable possibility of in-
termediate examination, and with the knowledge that the ab-
sence of reasonable care in the preparation or putting up of the
products will result in injury to the consumer's life or property,
owes a duty to the consumer to take that reasonable care.50
Donoghue created a negligence cause of action for injuries
caused by defective products. The court emphasized that a man-
ufacturer of a defective product owed a duty of care to the "ulti-
mate consumer" irrespective of privity. The range of persons to
whom that duty is owed expanded to include anyone who may
foreseeably come into contact with the product. 51
The legal development embodied in the Donoguhue decision
was achieved in the United States 15 years earlier in MacPher-
son.52 While English law remained stagnant at the Donoghue
stage until 1987, the United States' products liability law devel-
oped beyond MacPherson culminating in Greenamn and
§ 402A.5 3
(B) U.K prefers products liability legislation
Since Donoghue v. Stevenson, no major departure from the
rule had occurred. Unlike in the United States, England relied
upon a legislative evolution toward strict liability rather than a
nary claims which it makes upon its members as to deny a legal remedy where
there is so obviously a social wrong." Id. at 583.
50 Id. at 599.
51 See Hill v. James Crowe, 1 All E.R. 812, 816 (1978) (holding "if plaintiffs
injuries were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of such negligence, the manu-
facturer's liability would be established under Donoghue").
52 Interestingly, Lord Atkin cited Judge Cardozo's MacPherson opinion as fur-
ther support for his position. Lord Atkin stated: "It is always a satisfaction to an
English lawyer to be able to test his application of fundamental principles of the
common law by the development of the same doctrines by the lawyers of the courts
of the United States. In that country I find that the law appears to be well estab-
lished in the sense in which I have indicated. The snail had emerged from the
ginger beer bottle in the United States before it appeared in Scotland, but there it
brought liability upon the manufacturer. I must not in this long judgment do more
than refer to the illuminating judgment of Cardozo J. in Macpherson v. Buick Mo-
tor Co. in the New York Court of Appeals, in which he states the principles of law
as I should desire to state them . . . ." Id. 1932 App. Cas. at 598.
53 See, e.g., HOWELLS, supra note 46, at 71; see also Griffiths, supra note 46, at
360, STAPLETON, supra note 1, at 20.
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judicial evolution. 54 While the natural common law course was
shaping American products liability law with seminal decisions
like Greenman, the U.K. Parliament was passing statutes to
protect consumers. The legislative intervention ranged from im-
plying quality of goods as a matter of law, to statutory protec-
tion of consumers against particular goods, to specific
legislation protecting children.55 Even with all of these legisla-
tive developments, Lord Griffiths, Lord of Appeal in Ordinary,
observed that "England has not developed into a generalized
law of products liability."5 6 Lord Griffiths explained that
although the legislative trend increased protection of consum-
ers, the legislation "concentrated on creating criminal sanction
54 The reasons for this are easily explained by the English legal and political
system. England has no written constitution. Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court that
has the right to judicial review, i.e., reviewing the constitutionality of legislation,
the final word in England does not rest with the House of Lords, but it lies with
Parliament. As a result, English judges are not confident nor willing to engage in a
role of law and policy making. See R.M.S. Gibson, Products Liability in the United
States and England: The Difference and Why, 3 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 493, 516-517
(1974). Moreover, the rule of stare decisis is more religiously adhered to in England
than in the United States, thus, English law is slow to evolve and adapt, without
legislative intervention. In fact, until recently the House of Lords was bound by its
own precedent. This rigidity led to much criticism. Only since 1966 has the House
of Lords agreed to depart from its own precedent, and only in rare instances. See
Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) 1 W.L.R. 1234, 1234 (1966). "Their Lord-
ships nevertheless recogni[zle that too rigid adherence to precedent may lead to
injustice in a particular case and also unduly restrict the proper development of
the law. They propose, therefore, to modify their present practice and, while treat-
ing former decisions of this House as normally binding, to depart from a previous
decision when it appears right to do so." Id. See generally MICHAEL ZANDER, THE
LAw-MAKING PROCESS 179-225 (3rd ed. 1993) (examining the nature of binding
precedent in the English court hierarchy). By nature by comparison to the U.S.,
judicial law-making in the U.K. is severely constrained and conservative.
55 See, e.g., Sale of Goods Act 1979 (c54) § 14(2) (1995) provides "[wihere the
seller sells goods in the course of a business, there is an implied term that the
goods supplied under the contract are of satisfactory quality." Section 5(1)(b) of the
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (c 50) (1978) provides that where injury is caused
by defective product "liability for the loss or damage cannot be excluded or re-
stricted by reference to any contract term or notice contained in or operating by
reference to a guarantee of the goods; Section 6 of the Consumer Safety Act 1978
which authorized the government to regulate the sale and supply of unsafe prod-
ucts, provided criminal penalties, for violators (the Consumer Safety Act has been
superseded by the Consumer Protection Act 1987)." See Griffiths, supra note 46, at
360 (listing numerous statutes dealing with consumer protection). For English
safety regulations see 5(2) HALsBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND, 976 (1995).
56 Griffith, supra note 46, at 360; see also CLARK, supra note 1, at 47. "The law
previously recognized no separate area of products liability." Id.
285
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for certain types of trading activity, and on providing for admin-
istrative remedies rather than for remedies in contract or
tort."
57
III. U.S.-U.K. CASE LAW COMPARISON.
(A) Introduction
The evolution of case law applying § 402A classified the
concept of defect into manufacturing, design, and inadequate
warning or instruction defect. 58 Unlike the U.S., English prod-
ucts liability law remained negligence based until the enact-
ment of the Consumer Protection Act (1987). English product-
liability case-law, to a certain extent, made reference to the type
of defect involved: manufacturing, design or inadequate warn-
ing. The purpose of this section is to place the Restatement
(Third) of 1997 and the Consumer Protection Act of 1987 within
their historical decisional context. To observe how American
courts applied § 402A, compared to how the English negligence
based regime functioned, a case on each defect was chosen for
comparative review.
(B) Manufacturing defects.
(1) United Kingdom.
In Hill v. James Crowe Ltd.,59 the plaintiff was standing on
a wooden case while loading his truck. The wooden case col-
lapsed because it was poorly constructed and plaintiff fell injur-
ing himself.60 Rejecting the defendant's proof that his factory
was run with reasonable care, the court held that:
The manufacturer's liability in negligence did not depend on proof
that he had either a bad system of work or that his supervision
57 Griffiths, supra note 46, at 360. See also Peter Cartwright, Defendants in
Consumer Protection Statutes: A Search for Consistency, 59 MOD. L. REV. 225 (dis-
cussing U.K. statues that provide for criminal penalties to protect consumers, such
as the Trade Description Act 1968, the Consumer Protection Act 1987 Part II, the
Food Safety Act 1990 and the Property Misdescriptions Act 1991).
58 See Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671, 672 (1994). "There are
three general categories of product defects: manufacturing defects, design defects,
and marketing/packaging defects." Id. Most products liability treatises and case
books organize the material according to defect type. See, e.g., PHILLIPS, TERRY, &
VANDALL, supra note 6.
59 1 All E.R. 812 (1978).
60 See id. at 812.
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was inadequate. He might also be vicariously liable for the negli-
gence of his workmen in the course of their employment. If plain-
tiffs injuries were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of such
negligence, the manufacturer's liability would be established
under Donoghue.6 1
Theoretically, as long as the manufacturer exercised rea-
sonable care in his factory, he would not be liable for manufac-
turing defects. James illustrated that courts are willing to find
negligence based solely upon circumstantial evidence. This may
indicate the court's liberal application of res ipsa loquitur. Many
commentators posit that "the law is tantamount to the auto-
matic imposition of liability for injuries caused by defects due to
the product's failing to conform to its specifications and
design."6 2
(2) United States
In Orth v. Emerson Electric Co., White-Ridgers Division,6 3
plaintiffs were severely burned when their propane furnace in
their mobile home exploded. 64 The furnace in question was a
"sealed combustion" furnace appropriate for mobile homes. The
furnace was equipped with a control valve manufactured by de-
fendant. The expert testimony concluded that the "safety valve
malfunctioned due to a manufacturing defect."65 Consequently,
propane seeped out of the furnace combustion causing the ex-
plosion and fire. 66 The expert testimony, the court pointed out,
"though based on circumstantial evidence, was sufficiently reli-
able. '67 "This certainly," noted the court," 'justif[ies] an infer-
ence of probability' that the valve malfunctioned."68 The Court
of Appeals affirmed finding that there was sufficient evidence
61 Id. at 816.
62 HOWELLS, supra note 46, at 72. See also CLARK, supra note 1, at 10. 'The
presence of a manufacturing defect ... commonly gives rise to a presumption of
negligence on the part of the producer, and in some cases the application of the
maxim res ipsa loquitur can assist the plaintiff." Id.
63 980 F.2d 632 (10th Cir. 1992).
64 See id. at 634.
65 Id.
66 See id.
67 Id. at 638.
68 980 F.2d at 636.
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presented at trial to sustain the jury's verdict for the
plaintiffs.69
(3) Comparison
Both James and Orth involved a manufacturing defect. As
in James, the court in Orth was willing to infer negligence
solely on circumstantial evidence. Although in James the court
adhered to a negligence based regime, its outcome and reason-
ing was almost indistinguishable from Orth, which was based
on a strict liability regime (absent the words 'reasonable
foreseeabilty'). Thus when it comes to manufacturing defects, a
negligence scheme is tantamount to strict liability.
(C) Design defects
(1) United Kingdom
In Lambert v. Lewis, 70 the plaintiffs, a mother, father, and
their two children were passengers in a car.71 Suddenly, the tow
jaw of a trailer detached from a nearby Land Rover and the
trailer "careered across the road" colliding with plaintiffs' car.72
The father and one child were killed and the mother and the
other child were injured. All the parties to the action conceded
that the coupling connection to the Land Rover failed resulting
in the accident.73 The court analyzed the liability of the manu-
facturer of the tow jaw as follows: (1) was the tow jaw's design
defective, thus dangerous in use? And if so, (2) was the danger
foreseeable? 74 The court answered both questions in the affirm-
ative holding that the tow jaw manufacturer was "liable in tort
to the plaintiffs" because he "supplied and put into circulation
for use without intermediate examination a coupling that was
defective in design and dangerous in use."75
Relying upon expert testimony and on numerous past inci-
dents where the tow jaw failed, Judge Stocker held that the tow
jaw manufacturer was liable on the ground that the tow jaw
69 See id. at 637.
70 1 Lloyd's Rep. 610 (1978).
71 See id. at 611.
72 Id.
73 See id. at 612.
74 See id.
75 1 Lloyd's Rep.
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was defective in design, and that the dangerous use of the tow
jaw was foreseeable by any skilled engineer.76 Judge Stoker
pointed out that the defect in the design "could have been over-
come, for example by substituting a knob or plunger, or by rede-
signing the casting so as to afford a shroud for the handle." 77
(2) United States
In Voss v. Black & Decker Manufacturing Co.,78 a power
saw operated by the plaintiff severed his thumb.79-The saw was
equipped with a guard that "as soon as the pressure from the
contact with the wood stops, [would] automatically close[ I to its
original position."80 The plaintiff testified that while he was us-
ing the saw it "hit a knot, projecting the saw upward." When it
came down the blade was exposed and severed the plaintiffs
thumb.8 ' The plaintiff presented expert testimony illustrating
that by extending the movable guard, the saw would have been
made safer.8 2
To establish a prima facie case in strict liability for design
defect, the court asserted that, "the plaintiff must show that the
manufacturer breached its duty to market safe products when it
marketed a product designed so that it was not reasonably safe
that the defective design was a substantial factor in causing
plaintiffs injury."8 3 The court defined "not reasonably safe" as
"whether it is a product which, if the design defect were known
at the time of manufacture, a reasonable person would conclude
that the utility of the product did not outweigh the risk inherent
in marketing a product designed in that manner."8 4 The court
also found that the plaintiff had the burden to show that the
product was defectively designed and "was not reasonably safe
because there was a substantial likelihood of harm and it was
76 See id.
77 Id. at 621. If Judge Stockes found that there were no ways to overcome the
defective design, would he have still found for plaintiffs? It is not clear from Lam-
bert. That is, would the manufacturer still be negligent in the absence of an alter-
native design?
78 450 N.E.2d 204 (1983).
79 See id. at 206.
80 Id.
81 See id.
82 See id.
83 450 N.E.2d at 208.
84 Id.
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feasible to design the product in a safer manner." Based on the
foregoing elucidation of the law, the court held that the plaintiff
had presented sufficient evidence to submit the defective design
to the jury for it to decide whether the unprotected portion of
the blade met the minimum safety standards.8 5
(3) Comparison
Unlike manufacturing defects, there are some differences
between design defect cases under English negligence law and
American strict liability law. The differences are actually in
form not in substance. Both, albeit in different wording, require
that the product be defective rendering it dangerous, and that
the harm be foreseeable. Voss's "substantial likelihood of harm"
standard is another way of stating Lambert's "reasonably fore-
seeable" standard. Like Lambert, Voss required that there be a
safer alternative design. Voss, however, emphasized that the al-
ternative design must pass a cost-benefit test. It was clear that
the manufacturer in Lambert was only concerned with conven-
ience and not financial cost, and as such, the cost-benefit analy-
sis of alternative designs was not an issue. If the product was
more complex or the cost was not so negligible and the benefit
so great, as is the case in Lambert, the English court would
have engaged in a cost-benefit analysis.8 6 In sum, the differ-
ences between English negligence based design defect and
American strict liability8 7 design defect are minor.
(D) Inadequate warning defects
(1) United Kingdom
In Vacwell Engineering v. B.D.H. Chemicals,88 an explosion
occurred while the plaintiff-physicists, were washing ampoules
of a chemical called boron tribromide.8 9 One physicist was killed
and another injured.90 The defendant, B.D.H. Chemicals, was a
85 See id. at 209.
86 See Morris v. West Hartlepool Steam Navigation Co., 1956 App. Cas. 552
(articulating the nuances of a cost-benefit test). For a detailed examination of Mor-
ris, see infra.
87 The fact of the matter is that U.S. strict liability does not mean liability
without fault.
88 1 Q.B. 88 (1971).
89 See id. at 94.
90 See id.
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manufacturer and supplier of the boron tribromide.91 The de-
fendant was not aware that boron tribromide explodes when it
comes in contact with water.92 At the time of the accident, the
defendant supplied plaintiff with tribromide contained in glass
ampoules "upon which the label had been placed containing the
warning 'Harmful Vapour."' 93
In addition to holding B.D.H. liable under an implied-pur-
pose contractual cause of action, the court found B.D.H. liable
under tort. Judge Rees stated:
BDH failed to comply with their duty in two respects: first, they
failed to provide and maintain a system for carrying out an ade-
quate research into scientific literature to ascertain known
hazards, secondly, [defendants] failed to carry out an adequate re-
search into the scientific literature available to them in order to
discover the industrial hazards of a new, or little known, chemi-
cal. If that duty had been complied with, I have no doubt that the
explosion hazard noted by Gautier [a scientist] and others would
have come to light and a suitable warning given, which would
have prevented Vacwell dealing with the ampoules of boron tribro-
mide as they did." (emphasis added).9 4
The court found that the likelihood of the tribromide making
contact with water was foreseeable, and not remote; thus, the
plaintiff prevailed. 95
(2) United States
In Ross Laboratories v. Thes,96 a mother purchased
Polycose for her infant from a retailer. After reading the label
on the bottle, the mother fed her daughter the Polycose. The
daughter became very ill and dehydrated. 97 Polycose is "a solu-
tion consisting of glucose and water which is dangerous to in-
fants if it is not sufficiently diluted." The Polycose label
contained no such warning.98
91 See id.
92 See 1 Q.B. at 94.
93 Id. at 95.
94 Id. at 109.
95 See id. at 109-110.
96 725 P.2d 1076 (1986).
97 See id. at 1078.
98 See id.
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The court found that "[t]he nipple ready bottle, taken to-
gether with the similarity in name, label, and contents with rec-
ognized baby products, required Ross to foresee that some
consumers would mistakenly believe that Polycose was a prod-
uct to be fed to infants."99 The court concluded that Ross should
have "placed a warning on the product to protect consumers
against mistakes by Pay 'N Save or other merchants." 10 0 The
safety of infants, the court emphasized, "should not rest on the
stocking wisdom of the retailer."10 1
(3) Comparison
In warning-defect cases, it appears that English negligence
is identical to American strict liability. In both cases foresee-
ability and an assumption that a warning will be heeded, form
the crux of the action. Although knowledge of the harm was not
an issue in Ross, the court in Vacwell addressed the issue of
knowledge and stated that the manufacturer must use reason-
able care in researching and testing a product before putting it
into the market. Consulting four books was found to be inade-
quate research and thus not reasonable. This reasoning is illus-
trated in numerous American decisions, most notably in
Anderson v Owen-Corning Fiberglas Corp.,10 2 where the court
held "that knowledge or knowability is a component of strict lia-
bility for failure to warn." In sum, the differences between Eng-
lish negligence and American strict products liability are,
overall, minor.
(IV) RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY
(1997)
(A) Introduction
In May 1992, the ALI 10 3 decided it was time to restate the
law of Products Liability. They appointed Professors Aaron D.
Twerski of Brooklyn Law School, and James A. Henderson Jr. of
99 Id. at 1079.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 810 P.2d 549 (1991).
103 See supra note 37.
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Cornell Law School as Co-Reporters for this massive project. 10 4
After five years of debate, amendments, and controversy, the
ALI adopted the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liabil-
ity on May 20, 1997.105
The concept of defect is the "heart and soul" of the Restate-
ment (Third).10 6 The Reporters defined the concept of defect
functionally as opposed to doctrinally.10 7 One of the conse-
quences of the Reporters functional approach may result in the
elimination of other theories of products liability, in favor of cre-
ating a new functional products liability system.'08 In fact, the
revised draft article 2 of the UCC109 indicates that the Restate-
ment (Third)'s conceptualization of defect would become the
standard under the UCC's implied warranty of merchantability,
where personal injury is involved. 110 In effect, this abolishes
104 See Bruce Kaufman, ALI Membership Grants Final Approval to Influential
Product Liability Treatise, BNA PRODUCTS LIAILITY DAILY, May 23, 1997, avail-
able in WESTLAW, BNA Library, BNAPLD File.
105 See id. On April 20, 1993, the Reporters published their "Preliminary Draft
No. 1" entitled "Liability for the Sale or Distribution of Defective Products." Since
then, several preliminary drafts were discussed, and Tentative Draft No. 1 1994,
Tentative Draft No. 2 1995, and Tentative Draft No. 3 1996, and Proposed Final
Draft 1997, have been published.
106 See supra note 1.
107 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. n.
108 See generally Oscar S. Gray, The Draft ALI Product Liability Proposals:
Progress Or Anachronism? 61 TENN. L. REV. 1105 (1994). "Under the proposals,
there would be no liability in negligence, or for breach of warranty, for marketing
an unreasonably dangerous product unless there were a manufacturing or warn-
ing defect, or unless the plaintiff could establish the technical and economic feasi-
bility of an alternative design that would make the product in question safer." Id.
109 Prior to the ALI, May, 1997, annual meeting, both ALI and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws [hereinafter NCCUSLI ap-
proved in principle the following Comment to article 2-404 [2-314:
When recovery is sought for injury to person or property that allegedly
resulted from manufacturing or design defects in goods sold or inadequate
instructions or warnings, the applicable state law of products liability de-
termines whether the goods are merchantable under Section 2-404.
Merchantability in the context of a claim to recover for injury to person or
property is synonymous with the level of safety required for the goods as a
matter of public policy adopted by the courts of this state or, if applicable,
the Restatement of the Law (Third), Torts: Products Liability.
The comment further states that the implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose and express warranties, in cases involving personal injury, are governed
by article 2 of the UCC.
110 An examination of UCC revised article 2 (May 1997 draft) illustrates the
intended far-reaching implications of the Restatement (Third). Revised article 2
states that in personal injury actions, the concept of defect should follow state
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contract remedies in personal injury cases.111 Even negligence
doctrine, as it relates to injuries caused by products, has been
products liability law. In other words, if the Restatement (Third) is adopted in
State X and the injured party pursues an implied warranty of merchantability ac-
tion, the plaintiff must satisfy the functional definition of defect under the Restate-
ment. That is, he may not rely on the merchantability standard as enunciated in
the UCC.
It is stated by the Reporters that "[cilaims based on product defect at time of
sale or other distribution must meet the requisites set forth in Subsection (a), (b),
and (c), or other provision in this chapter 1." Regardless of label, be it implied
warranty of merchantability, strict liability, or negligence, the plaintiff must es-
tablish the requisites of Subsection (a), (b) or (c). § 2 cmt. n. Most significantly, the
Reporters assert that "failure to meet the requisites of s 2(a), (b), or (c) will defeat a
cause of action under either negligence, strict liability, or implied warranty of
merchantability." Reporters Notes' § 2 cmt. n. Although the Reporters provide that
in cases where multiple theories are alleged by plaintiff, they leave to "local law
the question of the procedural stage in a tort action at which plaintiff must decide
under which theory to pursue the case," the Reporters recommend State proce-
dures to limit the theories upon which a plaintiff may pursue his action. "This
Restatement contemplates that a single tort definition of defect will emerge re-
gardless of the characterization of the claim as sounding in tort or in implied war-
ranty of merchantibility," the Reporters predict. Reporters' Notes' § 2 cmt. n. The
Reporters advocate that a plaintiff may not allege multiple claims, where one or
more of the claims are "factually identical." It seems that the Reporters are sug-
gesting that, what they perceive as duplicative claims, such as implied warranty of
merchantability, strict liability and negligence, should be abolished in cases of
products liability in favor of a new products liability system based solely on a func-
tional definition of defect. The Reporters note that since design and warning defect
are subject to a risk-utility analysis, bringing a claim under negligence, strict lia-
bility, or warranty of merchantability would be duplicative. This the Reporters ex-
hort "would generate confusion and may well result in inconsistent verdicts."
However, the Reporters emphasize that the plaintiff can choose the more advanta-
geous theory. Moreover, the Reporters state that "[cilaims based on misrepresenta-
tion, express warranty, and implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose, in
particular, are not within the scope of this chapter and thus are unaffected by it."
Limiting the applicability of negligence, the Reporters claim that "negligence re-
tains its vitality as an independent theory of recovery for a wide range of product-
related, harm-causing behavior. This Restatement includes several such topics in
later Chapters, including post-sale failure to warn (see s 10); post-sale failure to
recall (see s 11); and a successor's liability for its own failure to warn (see s 13)." Id.
§ 2 cmt. n.
From the forgoing, it would seem that the Reporters effectively advocate that
since the new regime is a functional regime, negligence should be allowed in lim-
ited instances, product defect not being among them. This position could also have
far reaching consequences on contract law. Does this mean that a plaintiff injured
by a defective product can only pursue his claim under a functional tort liability
system? It may well be the case. See generally Gray, supra note 108, at 1111 (call-
ing comment j (now cmt. n) "a proposition of breathtaking audacity" and void of
precedent).
111 See id.
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radically altered. In addition to the traditional elements of neg-
ligence, 112 persons injured by a defective design must prove a
feasible alternative design. 1 3 The courts will determine
whether these far reaching consequences take hold in American
products liability." 4
The Restatement (Third) indicates that design and warning
defects are, to a great extent, subject to negligence principles.
Commentators have long suggested "that strict tort liability is
but a chimera that hides de facto negligence analysis.""115 The
Reporters admit that the new theory for design and warning
defect is similar to the "reasonableness test traditionally used
in determining whether an actor has been negligent."" 6 Thus
there will be no strict liability, in the full sense of the word, in
cases of defective design and inadequate warnings or instruc-
tions. Nonetheless, the Reporters observe that "many courts in-
112 Duty, breach, causation, and damages.
113 See Oscar S. Gray, supra note 108, at 1108 (describing Restatement (Third)
proposals as "a truncated negligence test"); see also Teresa Moran Schwartz, The
Impact of the New Products Liability Restatement on Prescription Products, FOOD
& DRUG L.J. 399, 458 (1995) (lamenting that the standard for recovery under Re-
statement (Third) has been elevated to "super negligence"); Frank J. Vandall, Con-
structing A Roof Before the Foundation is Prepared: The Restatement (Third) of
Tort: Products Liability Section 2(b) Design Defects, 30 U. MICH. L.J. REFORM 261,
262 (1997) (calling the Restatement (Third) proposal "radical negligence").
114 The New York Court of Appeals rejected the position that implied warranty
of merchantability and strict products liability, causes of action, are identical.
Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730 (1995). The Denny court asserted that
strict products liability and breach of implied warranty of merchanability "are not
identical in New York and that the latter is not necessarily subsumed by the for-
mer." Id. In contrast, the Michigan Supreme Court held that, whether based on
implied warranty or negligence, Michigan follows a "pure negligence.. . risk-util-
ity" balancing in design defect cases. See Gawenda v. Werner Co., 932 F.Supp. 183,
187 (E.D Mich. 1996).
115 M. Stuart Madden, Strict Product Liability Under Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 402A: 'Don't Throw the Baby Out with the Bathwater,' 10 ToURO L. REV.
123, 125 (1993); see also William A. Dreier, Design Defects Under the Proposed
Section 2(b) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability - A Judge's
View, 30 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 215, 226-228 (1997) (noting that although differ-
ences between strict liability and negligence regarding burden of proof and de-
fenses exist, in practice, "analysis under strict liability did not differ much, if at all,
from analysis under negligence").
116 Id. § 1 cmt. a.
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sist on speaking of liability based on the standards described in
2(b) and (c) as being 'strict."' 117
At this point in the discussion, Justice Cardoza's reflections
on ALI's mission seem appropriate. Describing the arduous and
agonizing task of a restatement, J. Cardoza stated,
At the beginning there has been need to gather from the pro-
nouncements of the courts the principle or the rule implicit in
their judgments, to find the soul of the decision beneath its integ-
ument of clay. This in itself is a wearisome and poignant task,
especially when the soul reveals itself in the end as a soul already
lost, an erring and blighted spirit, unworthy to be released, lest,
meeting its fellow spirits, it poison and corrupt them.118
Courts have realized that the standard for design and warning
defects, in essence have become negligence, but they do not
want to confess that this negligent spirit exists; perhaps be-
cause they feel it is an "erring and blighted spirit, unworthy to
be released." The soul of strict liability, the protection of the
consumer, has been lost. What now, many would ask?
To say the least, commentators are split on this strict liabil-
ity/negligence anomaly. Some commentators believe that the
Restatement (Third) honestly restated the law of products lia-
bility as it stands in the majority of jurisdictions;11 9 others
charge that the Restatement (Third) has brought back the old
"rule of caveat emptor. ' 2 o
117 Id. Many commentators observe that the black letter law tends to appear
strict while the comments explain the rule in terms of negligence. See, e.g., David
Owen, supra note 1, at 762 (describing the paradox as "a pig-is-a-mule definition").
118 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATURE: AND OTHER ESSAYS AND AD-
DRESSES, 123-124 (1986).
119 See Dreier, supra note 115, at 238 (stating that "[u]nder the proposed Re-
statement (Third) the law has not changed" but has been "explained more pre-
cisely"); see also Michael Prince, Law Panel Offers New Rule for Design Defect
Cases: Plaintiffs Attorney Fear Product Liability Harder to Prove, BUSINESS INSUR-
ANCE, June 16, 1997 (quoting Madden describing the RESTATEMENT (Third): "[It is]
a refinement of the law and not a changing of the law"); Sheila L. Birnbaum and J.
Russell Jackson, In the New Restatement On Torts, the Reporters Distinguishes
Manufacturing Defects from Design and Warning defects, NAT'L L.J., August 4,
1997, B5 (opining that the Restatement (Third) "more accurately articulates the
current state of products liability law, and does so in a more comprehensive fash-
ion, than its predecessor").
120 Guido Calabresi & Jeffrey 0. Cooper, New Direction in Tort Law, 30 VAL. U.
L. REV. 859, 866 (1996). See also Vandall, supra note 113, at 267 (lamenting that
the Reporters failed to truthfully Restate Products Liability and instead they "an-
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Although this inquiry is by no means exhaustive, the litera-
ture and case law consulted for this Comment suggests that the
Restatement (Third) restated products liability law as it stands
in the majority of jurisdictions, but runs contrary to a strong
minority of jurisdictions. The Reporters could have done a bet-
ter job by incorporating the minority jurisdictions in the Re-
statement (Third). Particularly, the requirement of an
alternative design should not be absolute. An alternative design
could have been emphasized in the comments but not incorpo-
rated into the black letter law. The risk-utility test should have
been either an alternative test to consumer expectations or
should have given consumer expectations a more prominent
role in the risk-utility balance.
Some would respond to these reflections as not representa-
tive of the majority jurisdictions, and that a restatement basi-
cally restates the law as it stands in the majority of
jurisdictions. But, a restatement is not a rigid and simple exer-
cise of counting the jurisdictions. It is an attempt to clarify and
better the existing law within the parameters of the common
law. While the intent of § 402A was pro-consumer, the intent of
the Restatement (Third) is pro-manufacturer. Neither § 402A
nor the Restatement (Third) achieved the objective of a liability
system, mainly the protection of the consumer, and a balance
between manufacturer interests and consumer interests.
(B) Liability under Restatement (Third)
The Restatement (Third) begins its restatement of products
liability law with section 1 entitled "Liability of Commercial
Seller or Distributor for Harm Caused by Defective Prod-
nounce[d] a new concept for design defect cases - 'radical negligence,' i.e., in addi-
tion to failure to exercise reasonable care, an alternative design must be shown");
Angela C. Rushton, Comment, Design Defects Under the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: A Restatement of Strict Liability and the Goals of a Functional Approach, 45
EMORY L.J. 389, 436 (1996) (claiming that the Restatement (Third) does not "repre-
sent the current state of the law nor satisfactorily states what the law should be");
Michael Prince, supra note 119 (quoting John Vargo describing the Restatement
(Third): "It has no academic integrity whatsoever if they want to follow what the
states say[;] . .. [t]his is written to protect corporations and insurance companies
and prevent consumers from recovering in suit." Id.; and quoting Professor Phillips
describing the Restatement (Third): "It's an attempt to change the law in a regres-
sive fashion").
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ucts." 12 1 Setting the stage for products liability, section 1(a) af-
firms that a seller or distributor of a defective product is liable
"for harm to persons or property caused by the product
defect."122
The Restatement (Third)'s predecessor, the Restatement
(Second), did not expressly divide the concept of defect into
manufacturing, design, and inadequate warning defect. The
evolution of case law applying § 402A, however, classified the
concept of defect into the above three categories. 123 Recognizing
the overwhelming authority dividing the concept of defect into
different types, 24 the concept of defect under the Restatement
(Third), to borrow David Owen's description, "is now trifur-
cated.' 25 This explicit classification, it is suggested, will abolish
strict liability and re-establish negligence as the American
products liability regime.126 Some commentators maintain that
the different types of defect routinely overlap or coincide. 127 Ar-
121 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 (P.F.D. 1997).
122 Id. § 1(a).
123 All major treatises and case books on Products Liability organize the mate-
rial according to defect type. See, e.g., PHILLIPS, TERRY & VANDALL supra note 6.
124 See, e.g., Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671, 672 (1994). "There
are three general categories of product defect: manufacturing defects, design de-
fects, and marketing/packaging defects." Id. But see, e.g., Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson
Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1163 (1973) (refusing to distinguish between manufacturing
and design defect in order "to avoid providing... a battle ground for clever coun-
sel"). Five years later, the California Supreme Court in Barker v. Lull Engineering
Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978), however, recognized the three types of defect. John
Wade's criticism of Cronin seems appropriate: "Indeed, the position of the Califor-
nia court in Cronin, in limiting the requirement to a defective product, would be
much more sustainable if the strict liability for products which it applies were con-
fined to the product which has its 'defect' developed unintentionally in the manu-
facturing process, thus leaving the design and warning cases to be handled under
the negligence techniques." John Wade, On the Future of Strict Tort Liability for
Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837 (1973). Other commentators oppose this trifurca-
tion. See e.g., Douglas E. Schmidt, Mark R. Kosieradzki and Carol Lynn O'Gara, A
Critical Analysis of the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Tort: Products Liability,
21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 411, 414 (1995). "Various commentators have expressed
the view that the distinction between manufacturing and design defect is 'an illu-
sion,' 'slippery,' and 'no longer tenable.' " (footnotes omitted). Id.
125 Owen, supra note 1, at 747.
126 See David Owen, supra note 1, at 748 (noting that the express division of a
defect into three types inherently "provides a mechanism for stripping away the
great bulk of strict liability from products liability law and returning it to negli-
gence, more or less").
127 See Jerry J. Phillips, The Unreasonably Unsafe Product And Strict Liabil-
ity, 72 CHI-KENT L. REV. 129, 129-136 (1996) (illustrating that design and warning
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guing that the differences may be subtle and difficult to distin-
guish, these commentators, in contrast to the Restatement
(Third), seemingly advocate a unitary concept of defect. Finally,
at least one commentator believes that misrepresentation
should be classified as a type of defect. 128
(1) Manufacturing defects
In accord with commentators and decisional law, the Re-
statement (Third) preserves the strict liability basis for a manu-
facturing defect, embodied in § 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. Section 2(a) provides that a product contains
a manufacturing defect when the product departs from its in-
tended design even though all possible care was exercised in the
preparation and marketing of the product. 129
More distinctly than design defects and inadequate warn-
ing defects, the Reporters observe, manufacturing defects "dis-
appoint consumer expectations."130 The Reporters recognize
that liability without fault in manufacturing defect cases "has a
long history in the common law."1 3 1 Retail and wholesale sellers
defects overlap with manufacturing defect and arguing that "[a] distinct-category
analysis is artificial, and contrary to the fact-specific approach of tort law"); see
also Vandall, supra note 113 at 267 (criticizing the trifurcation of defect and illus-
trating examples where depending on approach to product determines whether the
defect is a manufacturing or a design defect); see also Rebecca Korzec, Dashing
Consumer Hopes: Strict Products Liability and the Demise of the Consumer Expec-
tations Test, 20 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 227, 244 (1997) (arguing that trifurca-
tion of defect "often proves a futile and ineffective analytical exercise" and that
"design and warning flaws may overlap," and that "design and production defects
also may overlap or coincide").
128 Jerry Philips for example, contends that misrepresentation "cannot be arti-
ficially separated from design, manufacturing, and warning defects, since misrep-
resentation by advertising, product appearance, and otherwise is often a
substantial factor in determining product defectiveness on any basis." Phillips be-
lieves that the Reporters intentionally excluded misrepresentation "as an integral
element for determining defectiveness" because "the representational aspect of
products liability is an essential part of the consumer expectation test, which is the
underlying basis for strict liability under the Restatement (Second) of Torts section
§ 402A and which the Reporters are particularly anxious to reject." See Jerry J.
Phillips, Achilles' Heel, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1265, 1268 (1994); see also Phillips, supra
note 127, at 139-142 (discussing same).
129 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ToRTs: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(a).
130 Id. § 2(a) cmt. b.
131 "As early as 1266, criminal statutes imposed liability upon . . . brewers,
butchers, cooks, and other persons who supplied contaminated food and drink."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 1 CMT. a (1997).
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are also strictly liable for manufacturing defects. The Reporters
believe that "holding retailers and wholesalers strictly liable
creates incentives for them to deal only with reputable, finan-
cially responsible manufacturers and distributors, thereby help-
ing to protect the interests of users and consumers." 132
There is unanimous agreement favoring strict liability in
the case of a manufacturing defect. 133 Some commentators,
however, disagree with the Reporters' "element of deliberation"
distinction between design and manufacturing defects. Mar-
shall Shapo, for example, laments that the Reporters "refusal to
recognize the close parallels between these two kinds of deliber-
ation and choice renders their justification an ipse dixit."134 Be
that as it may, this section clearly subjects a manufacturing de-
fect to strict liability, i.e. liability will attach "even though all
possible care was exercised."'135
132 Id. § 2 cmt. a
133 See, e.g., Phillips v. Kimwood, 525 P.2d 1033 (Or. 1974). See also, David G.
Owen, supra note 1, at 748 (opining that strict liability for manufacturing defect,
embodied in the Restatement (Third) is "where almost all agree that it belongs").
See also MADDEN, supra note 10, § 9.6, at 330-332. (stressing that the "distinction
between negligence and strict tort liability" in manufacturing defect instances "are
most readily discernible and the principles of strict tort liability most readily
applied").
134 Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products Liability: The ALI
Restatement Project, 48 VAND. L. REV. 631, 659-660 (1995) (expressing "dubiety
about casting the distinction as ironclad," and arguing that sellers engage in
analogous decision making and in both cases, "they are aware of the level of statis-
tical risk to which they expose the consumer"). See also SHAPO, 1 THE LAW OF
PRODUCTS LIABILITY 9.01(2) (emphasizing same); Phillips, supra note 128, at
1269-1270 (contending that most policy consideration supporting strict liability in
a manufacturing defect situation also support the application of strict liability in a
design defect situation).
135 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2(a) cmt. b. "The rule for manufacturing defects
stated in § 2(a) imposes liability whether or not the manufacturer's quality control
efforts satisfy standards of reasonableness." Id. The comment provides several
objectives supporting strict liability in the case of a manufacturing defect, among
others, strict liability is said to "encourage greater investment in product safety"
than does a negligence regime, that it "reduces the transaction costs involved in
litigating" the issue of manufacturer fault, that it is fairer to the plaintiff in the
sense that it functions like the "concept of res ipsa loquitur, allowing deserving
plaintiffs to succeed notwithstanding what would otherwise be difficult or insuper-
able problems of proof," and that a manufacturing defect may not live up to the
consumer's reasonable expectations because manufacturer's choice of quality con-
trol is reflected in the manufacturing defect level and "their knowledge that a pre-
dictable number of flawed products will enter the marketplace entails an element
of deliberation about the amount of injury. Id. Most commentators agree that the
policy reasons behind strict liability can be summarized into six: "(1) compensation
[Vol. 10:275
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(2) Design defects
Determining the appropriate liability standard for design
defect cases has vexed courts and scholars, alike. 136 True to its
past, the Restatement (Third)'s design defect formulation has
proved to be most controversial. 137 It has resulted in a slue of
law review articles postulating that the Reporters have sub-
stantially departed from § 402A jurisprudence without deci-
sional support, 138 while others maintain that the Restatement
(Third) correctly restates design defect jurisprudence as it
stands in the majority of jurisdictions. 39
Unlike manufacturing defects, design defects conform to
the manufacturer's unit specifications. The issue in a design de-
fect case is "whether the specifications themselves create unrea-
sonable risks."' 40 The Reporters emphasize that design and
inadequate warning defects "are predicated on a different con-
cept of responsibility" - philosophical utility and economic effi-
through loss spreading; (2) deterrence; (3) encouraging useful conduct; (4) amelio-
ration of expensive and time consuming problems of proof; (5) protection of con-
sumer expectations; and (6) cost internalization." See Madden, supra note 115, at
127.
136 See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 880 (Alaska 1979) (recog-
nizing that design defects "present the most perplexing problems in the field of
strict products liability because there is no readily ascertainable external measure
of defectiveness).
137 See Larry S. Stewart, The ALI and Products Liability: 'Restatement' or 'Re-
form'?, TRIAL, September 1994, at 28, 29 (describing the alternative design issues
as being "the most hotly debated proposal made by the reporters").
138 See, e.g., Shapo, supra note 134, at 688-691; Comment, supra note 120, at
419; Frank J. Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts, Products Liability, Sec-
tion 2(b): Design Defect, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 167, 168 (1995); John F. Vargo, The Em-
peror's New Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorn A "New Cloth" for Section
402A Products Liability Design Defects - A Survey of the States Reveal a Different
Weave, 26 U. MEM. L. REV 493 (1996). See generally Symposium, On The ALI's
Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, Products Liability, 21 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 369 (1995); Symposium, Review of the System of Products Liability Law, 36 S.
TEX. L. REV. 227 (1995).
139 See, e.g., William A. Dreier, supra note 115, at 221 (arguing that criticisms
of 2(b) are "unfounded" and that when "section 2(b) is read together with the Re-
porters' extensive comments . . . it becomes clear that this perception is largely
incorrect"); Richard L. Cupp, Rethinking Conscious Design Liability for Prescrip-
tion Drugs: The Restatement (Third) Standard Versus a Negligence Approach, 63
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 76, 108 (1994) (stating that the "new Restatement's non-drug
design liability test - which is much closer to a true restatement of existing case
law than its prescription product design standard").
140 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. c.
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ciency. 14 1 In such context, section 2(b) provides that a design is
defective "when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the prod-
uct could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a rea-
sonable alternative design . . . and the omission of the
alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe."142
Finding that design defects should be viewed from the
"philosophical notion of utility and in the economic concept of
efficiency," 143 the Reporters assert that the ultimate benefit to
society is to achieve "the right or optimal amount of product
safety."144 Unlike manufacturing defects,1 45 the Reporters felt
that warning and design defect cases "require determinations
that the product could have reasonably been made safer by a
better design or instruction or warning."' 46 The Reporters con-
tinue that §§ 2(b) and (c) of the Restatement (Third) "rely on a
reasonableness test traditionally used in determining whether
an actor has been negligent." 47 The appropriate rules in design
defect cases, according to the Reporters' survey of decisional
law,' 48 should be "[siome sort of independent assessment of rel-
141 Id. § 2 cmt. a. See also Reporters' Notes on cmt. a: "Since the degree of risk
or safety in every product design is counterbalanced by considerations such as cost,
utility, and aesthetics, the basis of responsibility for design defect logically should
be based on the principle of optimality inherent in the philosophical notion of util-
ity and in the economic concept of efficiency." See also Owen, supra note 1, at 754
(rejecting strict liability and advocating negligence in design defect cases claiming
that "the goal of both design engineers and the law should be to promote in prod-
ucts an ideal balance of product usefulness, cost, and safety"). See also Richard C.
Ausness, Product Category Liability: A Critical Analysis, 24 N. Ky. L REV. 423, *1
(observing that "[slince no single definition of defect is broad enough to cover every
type of dangerous condition, courts have employed a variety of tests to determine if
a product is defective" and that risk-utility balancing is usually used in design
defects).
142 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2(b).
143 Id. § 2 cmt. a.
144 Id.
145 The manufacturing defect rational is not applicable to design defect cases,
according to the Reporters, because "[t]he element of deliberation in setting appro-
priate levels of design safety is not directly analogous to the setting of levels of
quality control by the manufacturer." Id. cmt. a. That is, when a manufacturer
reasonably designs a product, "the responsibility for product risks that cannot be
designed out of the product at acceptable cost is appropriately transformed to a
user population that is in a better position than the manufacturer to manage those
risks efficiently." Id. cmt. a.
146 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 1 cmt. a.
147 Id. § 1 cmt. a.
148 See generally the Reporters' Notes on cmt. (d). A recent article takes issue
with this contention. See Vargo, supra note 138, at 554 (finding after a detailed
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evant advantages and disadvantages, to which some attach the
label 'risk-utility balancing.' 149 The risk-utility test conducted
within the context of reasonable foreseeability, eschew the Re-
porters, establishes a "fair and efficient" liability system. 150 Re-
lying on Learned Hand's negligence risk-utility formula B<PL
and Professor John Wade's seven factors, 151 the Reporters accu-
survey of the jurisdictions that only seven states apply a "pure risk-utility test");
see also Vandall, supra note 138, at 168; Roland F. Banks and Margaret O'Connor,
Restating the Restatement (Second), Section 402A - Design Defect, 72 OR. L. REV.
411, 413 (finding only seven states that solely follow a risk-utility test); Howard
Klemme, Comments to the Reporters and Selected Members of the Consultative
Group, Restatement of Torts (Third): Products Liability, 61 TENN L. REV. 1173,
1174-1175 (criticizing the Reporters assertion that the majority of states follow a
risk-utility test claiming that "[more than half the cases cited fail to provide any-
thing but the most fanciful support for those statements); But see MADDEN, supra
note 10, § 8.3, at 299 (observing that "the majority rule posits that plaintiff cannot
establish a prima facie case of defective design without evidence of a technologi-
cally feasible, and practicable, alternative to defendant's product that was avail-
able at the time of manufacture"); see also JAMES T. O'REILLY & NANCY C. CODY,
PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESOURCE MANUAL 66 (1993) (asserting that "[r]isk/utility is
the dominant method of deciding 'design defect' cases, though in rare circum-
stances, it is rejected in favor of the consumer expectation standard").
149 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. a.
150 Id. cmt. a. The Reporters state: "For the liability system to be fair and effi-
cient, most courts agree that the balancing of risks and benefits in judging product
design and marketing must be done in light of the knowledge of risks and risk-
avoidance techniques reasonably attainable at the time of distribution. To hold a
manufacturer liable for a risk that was not foreseeable when the product was mar-
keted might foster increased manufacturer investment in safety. But such invest-
ment by definition would be a matter of guesswork." Id.
151 See United State v. Carroll Towing Company, 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2nd Cir.
1947) (creating a risk-utility test to determine breach of duty of care by focusing on
the interplay between probability, gravity and injury - B<PL). John Wade's seven
factor inquiry is a more developed application of the B<PL forumula:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product - its utility to the user
and to the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product - the likelihood that it will cause
injury and the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same
need and not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the
product without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to
maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of
the product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the prod-
uct and their availability, because of general public knowledge of the
obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of suitable warn-
ings or instructions.
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rately state that the "risk-utility balancing" approach
"achieve[s] the same general objectives as does liability pre-
dicted on negligence."'1 52 Although the Reporters claim that a
risk-utility test "nicely describes the decisional calculus that
lies at the heart of products liability law," they admit that a
risk-utility analysis "may be problematic if relied upon exces-
sively as a mechanical device for producing automatic 'right'
answers. "153
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss
by setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.
John Wade, supra note 124, at 837-838.
152 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. a. Over two decades ago it was recognized
that liability for a design defect sounded in negligence. John Wade stated: "There
is little difference here between the negligence action and the action for strict lia-
bility." See John Wade, supra note 124, at 841.
153 Reporters' Notes on cmt. a. See, e.g., Theodore S. Jankowski, Focusing on
Quality and Risk: The Central Role of Reasonable Alternatives in Evaluating De-
sign and Warning Decisions, 36 S. TEx. L. REV. 283, 351 (1995).
"Risk-utility analysis remains the only judicial method for scrutinizing product de-
cisions in a way that rationally balances the societal goals at stake enables fair
compensation for those injured as a result of unreasonable decisions made con-
cerning product safety." Id.
Commentators have conceptualized risk-utility into two versions: economic
version and the reasonableness version. For an analysis of both version as they
relate to design defects under the Restatement (Third), see generally Michael D.
Green, The Schizophrenia of Risk-Benefit Analysis in Design Defect Litigation, 48
VAND. L. REV. 609 (1995). The economic version of risk-utility postulates that, to
borrow Richard Posner's formulation, "[i] f the cost of safety measures or of curtail-
ment - - whichever cost is lower - - exceeds the benefit in accident avoidance to be
gained by incurring that cost, society would be better off, in economic terms, to
forgo accident prevention." Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL
STUDIES, 29, 32 (1972), cited in Green, supra note 153, at 616. Thus, if foregoing a
certain safety feature which would cost the manufacturer $100 million and only
result in injury to persons, like losing an arm or finger, totaling 20 million, then
the design is not defective under the risk-utility balance. This economic version is
rigid and seemingly heartless. On the other side, the reasonableness version is
basically represented by John Wade's seven factors enunciated in his famous 1973
Mississippi Law Review article. The reasonableness version is less rigid and in-
cludes both economic and reasonableness variables, though it has its flaws. Where
does the Restatement (Third) place within these two versions? Green feels that the
Restatement (Third) places it in the middle. The requirement of an alternative
design acknowledges the need for a yardstick for an economic version comparison
and by adding 'reasonable' to the alternative design, the Restatement acknowl-
edged the reasonable person of the softer version. Id. at 623. Green's main criti-
cism of the Restatement is that it "fails to address the most difficult, perhaps
intractable, problem posed by the economic version of risk-benefit analysis, that
conundrum, identified earlier, is making comparisons between incommensurable.
Specifically, risk-benefit analysis entails comparing injuries and death, on the one
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The Reporters set up the risk utility test in the following
construction: "whether a reasonable alternative design would,
at reasonable cost, have reduced the foreseeable risks of harm
posed by the product 54 and, if so, whether the omission of the
alternative design . .. rendered the product not reasonably
safe." 155 Comment f lists several factors to guide courts in their
risk-utility balancing inquiry. 56 The main factors are "magni-
tude and probability of the foreseeable risks of harm," "strength
of consumer expectations," and the "relative advantages and
disadvantages" of the alteration considering "production costs,
product longevity, maintenance, repair, and esthetics." 5 7 The
alternative design is assessed by the reasonableness standard,
i.e., a standard that evaluates "the overall safety of the
product." 58
The burden of proving a reasonable alternative design, "at
the time of sale or distributions" rests on the injured person. 159
The Reporters further explain that the inquiry into the availa-
bility of an alternative design is "undertaken from the view-
hand, and the costs - often in dollars - of additional safety features on the
other." Id. at 624-625.
154 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. f. The Reporters emphasize "[wihen evaluat-
ing the reasonableness of a design alternative, the overall safety of the product
must be considered". Id.
155 Id. § 2 cmt. c.
156 See Id. § 2 cmt. f. "The factors include, among others, the magnitude and
probability of the foreseeable risks of harm, the instructions and warnings that
accompany the product, and the nature and strength of consumer expectations re-
garding the product. The relative advantages and disadvantages of the product as
designed and as it alternatively could have been designed may also be considered.
Thus, the likely effects of the alternative design on production costs; the effects of
the alternative design on product longevity, maintenance, repair, and esthetics;
and the range of consumer choice among products are factors that may be taken
into account." Id.
157 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. f.
158 Id.
159 Id. § 2 cmt. d. "Under prevailing rules concerning allocation of burden of
proof, the plaintiff must prove that such a reasonable alternative was, or reason-
ably could have been, available at time of sale or distribution." Id. For minority
view that allocates burden of proof on defendant see, e.g., Barker v. Lull Engage
Co., 573 P2d 443, 458 (Cal. 1978) (stating that a product is not defective in design
if "the defendant fails to prove ... that on balance the benefits of the challenged
design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design") (emphasis added).
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point of a reasonable person."160 In addition to the availability
of a reasonable alternative design, the plaintiff needs to show
that said alternative design "could have been practically
adopted" in order to establish defect.161 The Reporters point out
that both the plaintiff and defendant may introduce evidence on
the issue of alternative design and the "trier of fact may con-
clude that the product was defective notwithstanding that such
a design was not adopted by any manufacturer, or even consid-
ered for commercial use, at the time of sale."1 62 The plaintiff
further needs to prove causation, i.e., that the alternative de-
sign "would have prevented or reduced the harm for which the
plaintiff seeks recovery." 163 In order to establish causation, the
Reporters stress that there must be a sufficient increase in pre-
vention or reduction of harm by adopting the alternative de-
sign. 164 Furthermore, a design is defective "only when risks
were reasonably foreseeable." 65 The Reporters conclude that
the design defect approach they have adopted "is based on the
common sense notion that liability attaches only when harm is
reasonably preventable.' 66
Cognizant that non-manufacturing sellers, wholesalers and
retailers are not in a good position to adopt alternative and
160 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. c. Interestingly the Reporters contend that
the same policy reasons supporting a negligence regime are applicable in the de-
sign defect case. Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. c. See also, § 2 cmt. e. "It is not sufficient
that the alternative design would have reduced or prevented the harm suffered by
the plaintiff if it would also have introduced into the product other dangers of
equal or greater magnitude". Id.
165 Id. § 2 cmt. a. The Reporters claim that if a manufacturer is liable for a non
foreseeable risk that would translate into huge investment in insurance that is not
easy to estimate and is not equitable. "Thus, with respect to unforeseeable or incal-
culable risks, manufacturers would find it inherently impossible to adequately pro-
tect themselves with insurance." Id. See Grzanka v. Pfeifer, 694 A.2d 295 (N.J.
1997). Grzanka involved an alleged defective traffic light signal. Id. Comparing
with approval 2(b) of the Restatement (Third) with New Jersey law, the court re-
jected plaintiffs products liability claim noting that in a risk-utility analysis, in
addition to an alternative design, the plaintiff must prove that the manufacturer
could have reasonably foreseen the risk and that "the omission of the alternative
design renders the product not reasonably safe." Id. The court held that the plain-
tiffs "alternative design fails to meet the full test of Restatement (Third) § 2(b)." Id.
at 304.
166 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. f.
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safer designs or better warnings and instructions, the Report-
ers, in accordance with decisional law, state that "strict liability
is imposed on a wholesale or retail seller who neither knew nor
should have known of the relevant risks ... so long as a prede-
cessor in the chain of distribution could have acted reasonably
to avoid the risks."167 Although this rule reflects the common
law, the Reporters observe this rule has been neutralized by
legislative statutes immunizing the non-manufacturers.16,
The Restatement (Third)'s guideline factors for a risk-util-
ity balancing test, David Owen argues, are vague and "fail to
provide specific guidance on the balancing method on just how
the balance should be accomplished."1 69 Owen describes the Re-
statement (Third)'s "overall safety[,]" terminology as macro-bal-
ancing, that is, a balancing of the aggregate risk with the
product's aggregate social utility. This notion of "overall safety,"
according to David Owen, leads courts to miss the actual issues
that have been litigated in a design defect case.1 70 The issue in
a design defect case, Owen explains, is not whether the "acci-
dent-producing product was globally good or bad for society [;]"
rather the issue is whether by altering the product's design,
inexpensively and without seriously undermining the product's
usefulness, the accident could have been avoided.171 Relying on
the Learned Hand test1 72 and on Mark F. Grady's early work on
167 Id. § 2 cmt. o. Comment o further explains that "once it is determined that
a reasonable alternative design or reasonable instructions or warnings could have
been provided at or before the time of sale by a predecessor in the chain of destruc-
tion and would have reduced plaintiffs harm, it is no defense that a nonmanufac-
turing seller of such a product exercised due care." Id. See also id. cmt. (a), and § 1
cmt. e.
168 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. o.
169 David G. Owen, Toward A Proper Test for Design Defectiveness: "Micro-Bal-
ancing" Costs and Benefits, 75 TEx. L. REV. 1661, 1662 (1997) (examining risk-
utility balancing in detail and concluding that the term cost-benefit is more appro-
priate and that a micro-balancing approach will clear the confusion on what a cost-
benefit test should address).
170 Owen, supra note 169, at 1662.
171 David G. Owen, Risk-Utility Balancing Design Defect Cases, 30 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM, 239, 244-245 (1997).
172 For the Hand test enunciated in Carroll Towing see supra note 151. See
also Owen, supra note 169, at 1685 (stressing that "the Hand formula by nature
implies a micro-balance of the costs and benefits of adopting a particular rejected
precaution, and the formula works as well in strict products liability as it does in
negligence").
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the topic, 173 the "proper" test Owen advocates, is what he calls a
"micro-balance test[,]" that is, a "narrow" balancing of costs of
altering the design of an accident-producing product, along the
lines advocated by plaintiff, against the resulting safety benefits
in actually altering the design. 174 Instead of focusing on the
"overall risk, utility, or quality of a product," Owen's micro-bal-
ance test, focuses on the costs and benefits of plaintiffs advo-
cated alteration to the product's design to determine whether
the omission of such an alteration made the product
defective.175
The risk-utility test, as formulated by the Reporters, to a
great extent,176 necessitates an absolute requirement of an al-
ternative design in design defect cases. The alternative design
allows the court to assess the design defect next to an alterna-
tive design from the point of view of a reasonable person. 77 If
the plaintiff demonstrates that the product is not safe based on
the outcome of a dangers-vs. -benefits assessment, but he does
not provide an alternative design, the plaintiff will not pre-
vail.' 78 The Reporters suggest that in certain circumstances the
plaintiff need not show an alternative design to prevail. These
circumstances involve design defects that are "so manifestly un-
reasonable, in that they have low social utility and high degree
173 See Mark F. Grady, Untaken Precautions, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1989); see
also Mark F. Grady, A New Positive Economic Theory of Negligence, 92 YALE L.J.
799 (1983).
174 Owen, supra note 171, at 241. Owen proposed the following micro-balance
test: "A product is defective in design if the safety benefits from altering the design
as proposed by plaintiff were foreseeably greater than the resulting costs, includ-
ing any diminished usefulness or diminished safety." Id. at 247.
175 See id. at 245.
176 The Reporters did provide for a narrow exception in the case of a manifestly
unreasonable design. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) §2 cmt. e.
177 See id. § 2 cmt. d. "Assessment of a product design requires a comparison
between an alternative design and the product design that caused the injury, un-
dertaken the view point of a reasonable person." Id.
178 Shapo observes that "the Draft simply does not allow for the possibility that
a seller might be liable if it sells a product whose configuration is such that the
only feasible way to avoid its dangers would be to adopt a substitute, rather than
an "alternative design," or to forego manufacture of that product." Shapo, supra
note 138, at 663. Later on in his article, Shapo uses several examples to illustrate
his point, for example "[t]he Dalkon Shield certainly was a bad IUD. Suppose it
were the only IUD. Should that immunize it from suit;" does the Draft mean "that
the use of a product for cosmetic purposes on a limited population should be immu-
nized from litigation because there is no other way to achieve the same result?" Id.
at 673.
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of danger, that liability should attach even absent proof of a rea-
sonable alternative design." 179 The requirements contained in
sections 2 (a), (b), or (c) must be satisfied before liability would
attach in these cases. The Reporters clearly state that this does
not apply to inherently dangerous products such as firearms
and alcohol.18 0 The Reporters correctly observe that courts have
not held product categories liable.' 8 ' One commentator notes
that the alternative design requirement "effectively insulates"
such inherently dangerous products like cigarettes and alcohol
from design-defect liability.182
179 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) §2 cmt. e. "Several courts have suggested that the
designs of some products are so manifestly unreasonable, in that they have low
social utility and high degree of danger, that liability should attach even absent
proof of a reasonable alternative design. In large part the problem is one of how the
range of relevant alternative design is described." Id. Applying above formulations
to a toy gun that shoots pellets and causes injury to children, the Reporters explain
that a toy that shoots Ping-Pong balls that do not cause injury would be an alter-
native design, however, if the main character of this gun is its capacity to injure,
then there are no alternative designs. As such, the Reporters state that a court
"would declare the product design to be defective and not reasonably safe because
the extremely high degree of danger posed by its use or conception so substantially
outweighs its negligible social utility that no rational, reasonable person, fully
aware of the relevant facts, would choose to use, or to allow children to use, the
product." Id. The Reporters claim that only several courts adopt this approach,
thus the Reporters relegate this formulation to the periphery. But see McCarthy v.
Olin Corp., 1997 WL 395339 (2nd Cir N.Y.) (holding that bullets intended to rip
and tear upon impact "were not in defective condition nor were they unreasonably
dangerous for their intended use because the Black Talons were purposely
designed to expand on impact and cause severe wounding").
180 Tobacco was included as an inherently dangerous product in earlier drafts
of the Restatement. Tobacco was considered outside the traditional products liabil-
ity rules. However, the references to tobacco in the Restatement (Third) were de-
leted in the final vote approving the Restatement (Third) on May 20, 1997. The
ongoing negotiations between tobacco companies and the States regarding a lump
sum settlement for health injuries caused by cigarette smoke prompted the dele-
tion. See Kaufman, supra note 104.
181 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. a. "Products are not generically defec-
tive merely because they are dangerous." Id. The Reporters assert that an alterna-
tive design is required even if it is alleged that the product "is so dangerous that it
should not have been marketed at all." They continue: "Common and widely dis-
tributed products such as alcoholic beverages, tobacco, firearms, and above-ground
swimming pools may be found to be defective only upon proof of the requisite con-
ditions in Subsections (a), (b), and (c)." Moreover, "[aibsent proof of defect under
those Sections, however, courts have not imposed liability for categories of prod-
ucts that are generally available and widely used and consumed, even if they pose
substantial risks of harm." See id. cmt. d. For a recent examination of category
liability see generally Ausness, supra note 141.
182 See Ausness, supra note 141, at *3.
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Despite Comment f's explicit reference that "subsection
2(b) does not require the plaintiff to actually produce a proto-
type in order to make out a prima facie case," many commenta-
tors contend that the prototype inevitably will become an
absolute requirement.183 Several commentators vehemently ar-
gue that an absolute requirement of an alternative design does
not reflect the weight of authority,184 while others believe that
an alternative, safer design is part of the plaintiffs prima facie
case.
18 5
The consumer expectations 8 6 standard was rejected in
comment g to section 2.187 Acknowledging that the only "rival"
183 See, e.g., Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Defining the Boundaries of 'Alternative De-
sign' Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts: The Nature and Role of Substitute
Products in Design Defect Analysis, 63 TENN. L. REV. 329, 336 (1996) (expressing
concern that a prototype will more likely become an absolute requirement, predict-
ing that "if a court instructs a jury a reasonable alternative design is necessary, it
may be difficult for a plaintiff to prevail in a lawsuit without actually presenting
the alternative to the jury").
184 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 113, at 403 (conceding that risk-utility test
is "widely used" in design cases, but positing that "the additional requirement of a
reasonable alternative design is not universal"); see also Potter, 1997 WL *8 (Conn)
(asserting that the majority of jurisdictions do not require an alternative design).
But see Mary J. Davis, Design Defect Liability: In Search of a Standard of Respon-
sibility, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1217, 1245 (1993) (finding that the risk-utility inquiry
in a design defect claim always circles back to conduct and claiming that "most
jurisdictions require evidence of the availability of a feasible, practical alternative
at the time of manufacture before liability is imposed, specifically evaluating the
manufacturer's decision to reject that alternative").
185 See, e.g., MADDEN, supra note 10, § 8.3, at 299 ("[Ilndeed," Madden empha-
sizes, "the majority rule posits that plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of
defective design without evidence of a technologically feasible, and practicable, al-
ternative to defendant's product that was available at the time of manufacture").
186 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965). "The article
sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by
the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge will be un-
reasonably dangerous to him." Id.
187 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) cmt. c of the Reporters' Notes where the Report-
ers argue that "[an overwhelming majority of American jurisdictions rely on risk
utility balancing in design cases." Similarly, Madden observes that "courts and
legislators throughout the country have increasingly abandoned exclusive resort to
a consumer expectations standard, and adopted, de jure or de facto, a risk utility
approach." Stuart M. Madden, Products Liability, Products for use by Adults, and
Injured Children: Back to the Further, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1205, 1225 (1994). See also
Owen, supra note 1, at 761 (noting that the consumer expectations test derives
from contract and that contract law primarily operates in a strict fashion, thus, "by
banishing consumer expectations as a formal test of product defect, the Reporters
exploded the final obstacles to the complete and final victory of negligence princi-
ples in shaping the defect concept in design and warnings cases"). But see Philips,
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to the risk-utility test is the consumer expectations test, the Re-
porters claim that only a small minority of jurisdictions follow
solely a consumer expectations test; 88 and "[iun most instances
reference to consumer expectations is fully consistent with the
rule of this section." 18 9 Consumer expectations, no longer "con-
stitute an independent standard for judging the defectiveness of
product design." 90 Given that the way products are marketed
supra note 128, at 1265 (warning that the Reporters attempt to "eradicate" the
consumer expectation standard will not be easy because the consumer expectation
standard "underpins" the Uniform Commercial Code and that the European Com-
munity has adopted a consumer expectation standard as well).
188 See MADDEN, supra note 10, § 6.23 (observing that several states "doggedly
retain" the consumer expectations test, however, in cases involving children, many
of these jurisdictions consider foreseeability and feasible alternative design to
favor plaintiffs).
189 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), cmt. d, Reporters' Notes. The Reporter's analysis of
decisional law citing consumer expectations revealed the following observations.
(1) An alternative design is a predicate to a case, however, the court for-
mulate the jury instruction generally and coached in consumer expecta-
tions terms.
(2) Many courts talk of reasonable consumer expectations, yet define con-
sumer expectations within risk-utility language.
(3) Many courts rely on consumer expectations as a factor in risk utility
balancing.
(4) In cases where res ipsa loquitor inference is used, the courts find that
the products failed to meet the consumer's expectations.
(5) In food product cases courts rely on consumer expectations.
Id.
190 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. g. "Courts often use the term 'reasonable
consumer expectations' as an equivalent of 'proof of a reasonable, safer design al-
ternative,' since reasonable consumers have a right to expect product designs that
conform to the reasonableness standard in § 2(b)." Id. Although the consumer ex-
pectations standard is not relevant to section 2(b) because it does not take into
account "whether the proposed alternative design could be implemented at reason-
able costs," the Reporters emphasize that consumer expectations "about product
performance and the dangers attendant to product use affect how risks are per-
ceived and relate to foreseeability and frequency of the risks of harm, both are
relevant under § 2(b)." Id. But see, § 2 cmt. g: "Although consumer expectations are
not adequate to supply a standard for defect in other contexts, assessments of what
consumers have a right to expect in various commercial food preparations are suf-
ficiently well-formed that judges and triers of fact can sensibly resolve whether
liability should be imposed using this standard." See James A. Henderson, Jr. and
Aaron D. Twerski, Arriving at Reasonable Alternative Design: The Reporters'
Travelogue, 30 U. MICH J. L. REFORM 563, 569 (1997) (proffering that "[a]lthough
they are an important factor in risk utility balancing, consumer expectations are
too amorphous to operate as an independent test for design defect").
But See Shapo, supra note 134, at 667 (suggesting "that the reporter are insuf-
ficiently cognizant of the power of this idea [of consumer expectations] beyond the
narrow compass of chicken bones in enchiladas"); see also Korzec, supra note 127,
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may influence consumer behavior and product choice, the Re-
porters believe that consumer expectations, although not deter-
minative of design defectiveness, "constitute an important
factor in determining the necessity for, or the adequacy of, a
proposed alternative design."191 The Reporters admit that
courts frequently rely on consumer expectations when address-
ing liability based on other theories of liability. 192 In design de-
fects cases, the Reporters claim that courts "use the term
'reasonable consumer expectations' as an equivalent of 'proof of
a reasonable, safer design alternative." ' 193
The Reporters argue that consumer expectations in design
and warning defects are "more difficult to discern than in the
case of a manufacturing defect." 9 4 Unlike manufacturing defect
cases, where manufacturers set quality control at a certain level
and are aware that some products will leave the assembly line
defective and cause injury, "[a] reasonably designed product
still carries with it elements of risk that must be protected
against by the user or consumer since some risks cannot be
designed out of the product at reasonable cost."' 95 It follows, the
Reporters posit, that "[t]he element of deliberation in setting
appropriate levels of design safety is not directly analogous to
the setting of levels of quality control by the manufacturer."' 96
277, 249 (insisting that "[tihe abandonment of the consumer expectations test may
be shortsighted and imprudent" and apparently ignores "the fact that a central
and paramount purpose of products liability law is the protection of legitimate con-
sumer safety expectations").
191 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) cmt. g. See also Shapo, supra note 134, at 669
(describing the Reporters' conceptualization of consumer expectation test as only
an "overshadowed" factor not recognizing "the centrality of product promotion in
creating and conditioning consumer choices").
192 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. g.
193 Id.
194 Id. cmt. a. See also Potter, 1997 WL 265206 *9 (Conn) (recognizing that
consumer expectation may not be appropriate in complex design case); Soule v.
General Motors Corp. 882 P.2d 298 (Cal. 1994).
195 See Shapo, supra note 134, at 660 (insisting that "[tihe Reporters' refusal to
recognize the close parallel between these two kinds of deliberation and choice ren-
ders their justification an ipse dixit"); see also Korzec, supra note 127, at 244. "De-
ciding the design defect on a negligence-based risk/utility analysis and the
manufacturing defect on the consumer expectation standard becomes unworkable
and doctrinally indefensible." Id.
196 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. a. For a contrary view see Shapo, supra note
134, at 659-660 (maintaining that "[slellers engage in analogous decision making
when they choose levels of product risk for the purposes of both design and quality
[Vol. 10:275
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Although rejected, the Restatement (Third) recognizes that con-
sumer expectations have a special and significant role to play in
injuries caused by defective food products. 197 Additionally, con-
sumer expectations are not an "independent basis for denying
recovery."' 98 The Reporters assert that openness and obvi-
ousness of risks which the consumer expects does not "prevent a
finding that the design is defective." In both situations, how-
ever, open and obvious risks may be relevant "but in neither are
they controlling.' 99
The Restatement (Third) recognizes the harsh criticism the
consumer expectations test had received for its seemingly un-
just outcomes in many situations, particularly in cases involv-
ing children. 200  The peripheralization of the consumer
expectation test, nonetheless, attracted heated debate. 20 1 Some
commentators argue that the Reporters have scrapped, without
control" and that "[i]n both cases, they are aware of the level of statistical risks to
which they expose the consumer").
197 See Shapo, supra note 134, 668 (applauding the Reporters recognition but
complaining that the Reporters "are insufficiently cognizant of the power of this
idea beyond the narrow compass of chicken bones in enchiladas").
198 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. f (1997).
199 Id. § 2 cmt. f. "The mere fact that a risk presented by a product design is
open and obvious, or generally known, and that the product thus satisfies expecta-
tions, does not prevent a finding that the design is defective." Id. See also § 2 cmt. c
which explicitly states that the "obviousness of a design related risk" does not pre-
clude a finding of defectiveness.
200 Many commentators, most notably Dean John W. Wade, have criticized the
consumer expectation test, primarily for the injustice in situations where the con-
sumer knew about the product danger and was barred from recovery under the
consumer expectation test. See Wade, supra note 124, at 825; see also Madden,
supra note 187, at 1240 (elaborating, although addressing injury to children, that
the harsh effects of the consumer expectation test and the open and obvious de-
fense can be neutralized by the Third Restatement and "[iun their stead," "the Re-
porters promote exclusive resort to a risk-utility evaluation, fortified by concepts of
reasonable foreseebility, which increases the likelihood liability for manufacturer
who put into household use products nominally intended for adults, but which
foreseeably invite misadventure with children").
201 See Vargo, supra note 138, at 518 (contending that "this 'so-called' con-
sumer expectation factor is so overshadowed by section 2(b) black-letter rule for
design defects, which clearly makes proof of alternative design an absolute re-
quirement, that the consumer expectation factor exists in name only"). Shapo be-
lieves that "[a] lamentable defect in the Reporters' analysis lies in its downgrading
of consumer expectations as a factor in judging design defect issues." Shapo bases
this charge on two observations: (1) that the Reporters failed to recognize the "the
centrality of product promotion in consumer choice"; and (2) that the weight of
authority does not support the Reporters claims - citing several articles taking is-
sue with Reporters' case analysis. See Shapo, supra note 134, at 666.
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justification, the consumer expectations standard, which was
explicitly enunciated in comment i of § 402A. In response to this
charge, other commentators insist that the intent of the draft-
ers of § 402A, based on the legislative history and subsequent
scholarly publications by § 402A drafters, in fact was to limit
the applicability of comment i to manufacturing defects and not
to include design and warning defects within its ambit.20 2
Several commentators, 20 3  and a recent Connecticut
Supreme Court decision, 20 4 take issue with the Reporters' as-
sertion that the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions have
adopted a risk-utility test to determine design defectiveness. 20 5
Some commentators have insisted that the risk-utility test is
202 Claiming that the drafters of § 402A "did not contemplate strict liability
based on consumer expectations test for design defects," Henderson insists that
the consumer expectations test was intended for manufacturing defects. They note
that in 1963 the focus was on abolishing the privity rule and imposing strict liabil-
ity in manufacturing defects. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 190, 572-573.
"Other scholars have made this observation," intimate Henderson and Twerski,
referring to the writings of Dean Prosser, in particular to his Hornbook (4th ed.),
where Prosser basically admitted that design defect cases are subject to negligence
doctrine clothed in strict language. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 96, at 644-645 (4th ed. 1971).
203 See, e.g., Shapo, supra note 134, at 666 (finding that out of the fourteen
cases cited by the Reporters to support their position that the risk-utility in design
defects reflect the majority, only one to three decisions supported the sole risk-
utility test); see also Vargo, supra note 138, at 493 (contending after extensive ju-
risdictional survey that only three states' common law have adopted the alterna-
tive design requirement in design defect cases); see also Stewart, supra note 137,
at 29-30 (noting that the consumer expectations test as an equal alternative to
risk-utility is "widely used" by courts, referring to a compilation of pattern jury
instruction from around the country, presented to the Reporters, which "indicate
that at least 28 jurisdictions currently instruct juries that they may find a product
defective if it fails to perform as a reasonable consumer would expect," and con-
cluding that some 37 jurisdictions use or make references to the consumer expecta-
tion test").
204 See Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic, 1997 WL 265206 *7-8 (Conn) (holding
that "[clontrary to the rule promulgated in the Draft Restatement (Third), our in-
dependent review of the prevailing common law reveals that the majority of juris-
dictions do not impose upon plaintiffs an absolute requirement to prove a feasible
alternative design" (footnote omitted)); but see Banks et al. v. ICI Americas, Inc.,
450 S.E.2d 671, 734 (Ga. 1994) (adopting risk-utility balancing in design defect
cases after court conducted "an exhaustive review of foreign jurisdictions and
learned treatises" that revealed that a risk-utility test reflects the "general consen-
sus" [citations omitted]).
205 See Jankowski, supra note 153, at 327 (observing that "the gravitational
pull in design defect cases has been toward the risk-utility balance and its concom-
itant, the reasonable alternative design").
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"useless in jury instructions."20 6 Calabresi & Cooper, for exam-
ple, criticize the risk-utility test as "profoundly case by case,"
and expensive. 20 7 These commentators argue that the consumer
expectation test is an appropriate test in design defect cases. 208
These commentators would like the consumer expectation test
to take a more prominent position in the Restatement (Third).
At the very-least, some courts and commentators proffer, the
risk-utility factors could be incorporated into the consumer ex-
pectations standard for ascertaining defectiveness 20 9 or that
consumer expectations could be an alternative standard.
210
206 See Joseph W. Little, The Place of Consumer Expectations In Product Strict
Liability Action For Defectively Designed Products, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1189, 1192,
and n. 24 (1994) (claiming the risk-utility test "is utterly useless in jury
instructions").
207 See Calabresi & Cooper, supra note 120, at 865. The authors propose a "bet-
ter" approach. This new approach reintroduces the consumer expectation test in
least cost avoider language: "to try to decide what categories of people, buyers or
sellers, users or producers-are in a better position to decide whether, and to what
degree, avoidance is worth it, and place the cost of non-avoidance on those catego-
ries." Id. For a survey of the scholarly formulations of an appropriate standard in
design defect cases, see generally SHAPO, supra note 134, at 9.02-9.06(1) (sur-
veying scholarly formulations of tests for design defect cases).
208 See Phillips, supra note 127, at 167 ("A standard of consumer expectations
certainly comes nearer to achieving fairness than does a restrictive standard that
requires plaintiffs to prove that a reasonably safer alternative design exists as a
prerequisite to recovery for product design defectivness); see also Little, supra
note 206, at 1195-1198, 1204 (proposing test for design defects modeled on the
House of Lords' Rylands v. Fletcher decision, where "[w]hat consumers expect
should weigh heavily").
209 See Potter, 1997 WL 265206 *9 (Conn). "We find persuasive the reasoning
of those jurisdictions that have modified their formulation of the consumer expec-
tation test by incorporating risk-utility factor into the ordinary consumer expecta-
tion analysis." (footnotes omitted). Id. In his concurring opinion, Justice Berdon
expressed great concern, and cautioned that the majority's dicta regarding the in-
corporation of risk-utility factor into the consumer expectation test in complex de-
sign cases, "sounds dangerously close to requiring proof of the existence of a
reasonable alternative design, a standard of proof that the court properly rejects
today." (footnotes omitted). Id. at *30; see also Shapo, supra note 134, at 668
(stressing "that there is no reason that a court cannot blend 'consumer expecta-
tions' or 'consumer contemplation' analysis with a 'risk-utility' concept" and that
"[s]ome courts have, in fact done this").
210 See Saratoga Fishing Co. v. Marco Seattle Inc., 69 F.3d 1432, 1441 (91h Cir
1995). In Saratoga, the court noted that their adoption of a risk-utility balancing
for design defects in admiralty cases does not "necessarily preclude future admi-
ralty plaintiffs from showing a design defect using the consumer expectations test."
Id. Basically, the court concluded that giving the plaintiff a choice of either risk-
utility or consumer expectations "is appropriate." In a side note, the defect was to a
great extent obvious. The court engaged in manipulative justice by relying on a
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Other commentators emphasize that many courts reject the ab-
solute requirement of an alternative, safer design enunciated in
the Restatement (Third).211 Such objections to the Reporters' re-
statement of design defect jurisprudence has led to charges that
they have not restated the law but rather engaged in tort
reform. 212
Despite the Reporters' caution that subsection 2(b) "should
not be construed to create artificial and unreasonable barriers
to recovery,"213 some commentators believe that section 2(b)
will drastically affect plaintiff's ability to recover for injuries
caused by defective design.21 4 Some Courts assert that proving
the alternative design is an extremely heavy burden 215 and in-
sist that a risk-utility analysis does necessarily require an al-
ternative design.21 6 This absolutist black letter law is viewed as
risk-utility analysis to overcome the open and obvious defense. See generally
Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 573 P.2d 443, 457-458 (Cal. 1978) (holding that "a
judge may properly instruct the jury that a product is defective in design" based on
a consumer expectations theory or a risk-utility theory). For jurisdictions that ad-
here to this alternative approach see MADDEN, supra note 10, § 6.7, at 101 (1995
Supp.) "In some states, the consumer expectations test is employed as one half of a
dual standard permitting a finding of defect if the product either falls short of rea-
sonable consumer expectations or its risk outweighs its utility." Id.
211 See SHAPO, supra note 134, $ 9.15(2)(b) (citing authority that "[slome courts
refuse to require a showing of a safe alternative design to prove a design defect").
212 See Stewart, supra note 137, at 30 (expressing concern regarding the Re-
porters citations of reform statutes in support of their positions, arguing that such
reliance on statutes cannot serve as authority for a Restatement and describing
the Reporters position as consonant with "tort reform").
213 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. f.
214 See Schwartz, supra note 113, at 403. "Thus, for design claims, the new
Restatement fails to include any current rules that would reduce plaintiffs eviden-
tiary burdens." Id. See also Bill Wagner, Reviewing the Restatement, TRIAL at 44,
45 (Nov. 1995) (listing several issues that will make it harder for plaintiffs under
the new Restatement, such as, hiring an expert in small cases will not be cost
effective, in severe injuries recovery will be reduced, and if plaintiff fails to develop
a better product his injury will not be compensated).
215 See Potter, 1997 WL 265206 (Conn) (holding that "the feasible alternative
design requirement imposes an undue burden on plaintiffs that might preclude
otherwise valid claims from jury consideration"). See also SHAPO, supra note 134,
9.15(2)(a). "Hurdles for plaintiffs on this issue include requirements that they
show what injuries would have resulted had an allegedly safer alternative design
been used and that they prove the extent of enhanced injuries caused by the al-
leged defect." Id.
216 See Banks et al. v. ICI Americas, Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671, 674-675 (Ga. 1994).
In Banks the court adopted a risk-utility balancing test for design defects but rele-
gated the alternative design to a factor. The court stated that "the trier of fact may
consider evidence" pertaining to an alternative safer design. (emphasis added) Id.
42http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol10/iss1/11
19981 NEGLIGENCE IS BACK WITH A VENGEANCE 317
harsh on the plaintiff.217 Moreover, the burden on the plaintiff
to show an alternative design "requires proof of too much de-
tailed evidence, evidence which is more readily accessible to the
defendant than the plaintiff."218
It is true that requiring an alternative design will weed out
unmeritorious claims, but the other side of the same coin is that
an alternative design requirement will effectively weed out mer-
itorious small claims.21 9 Law firms will not invest their money
on developing an alternative design and hiring expert witnesses
where the amount of recovery will not be cost effective. 220 An
alternative design should be a factor, an extremely important
factor for that matter, but not an absolute requirement.
The factors to be considered in an alternative safe design, according to the court
include: "the feasibility of an alternative design; the availability of an effective sub-
stitute for the product which meets the same need but is safer; the financial cost of
the improved design; and the adverse effects from the alternative." See id. at 675
n.6. Interestingly, in his concurring in part and dissenting in part opinion, Justice
Fletcher expressed his opposition to the majority relegating of the alternative de-
sign to a factor rather than an absolute requirement. See Id. at 676; see also Phil-
lips, supra note 127, at 149 ("the courts tend to use a risk-benefit analysis without
requiring proof of an alternative design. Such proof is permissible, by either side,
but not required. Consumer expectations considerations blend into this analysis").
But see Smith v. Keller Ladder Co., 645 A.2d 1269,1271 (N.J. 1994) (noting that NJ
statutory products liability law, which requires the proof of a feasible alternative
design, is in accord with the Restatement (Third)).
217 See Vargo, supra note 138, at 517. See also Banks & O'Connor, supra note
148, at 417 (positing that if the consumer expectations are not ascertainable then
negligence and an alternative design kick in, but this approach should be a factor
in the comments and not part of the black letter law).
218 Vargo, supra note 138, at 517.
219 See Cupp, supra note 183, at 336 (expressing concern that "the RAD re-
quirement may, in effect, immunize seller from all but relatively substantial
claims"); see also Frank J. Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Lia-
bility Section 2(b): The Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement, 61 TENN. L.
REV. 1407, 1426 (1994) (noting that unless injury was substantial "the expenses
involved in proving a reasonable alternative design far outweigh his potential
award of damages").
220 See Cupp, supra note 183, at 336 (insisting that "the prospect of costly ex-
pert witness fees likely will prevent many meritorious cases from being filed"); see
also Corboy, supra note 44, at 1095-96; Vandall, supra note 219, at 1426 (elaborat-
ing that if injury was not so serious the cost of an alternative design would out-
weighs the worth of pursuing the case).
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(3) Inadequate Warning Or Instruction Defect221
Inadequate warnings or instructions are subject to the
same rules applicable to design defects. 222 Section 2(c) states
that a product is defective because of inadequate instructions or
warnings "when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the
product could have been reduced or avoided by the provision of
reasonable instructions or warnings ... and the omission of the
221 Some commentators take issue with the classification of warning under the
concept of product defect. Shapo opposes this description of a category of cases and
argues that it is bad English and that it is "confusing to the law." Shapo
vehemently argues that "equate[ing] the actual product with its image is to
confuse image and reality." "It is, indeed," stresses Shapo, "to befog the recognition
that the representational basis of products liability inheres not only in express
warranties and various kinds of misrepresentations but in the more general ways
in which products are promoted to the public." Marshall S. Shapo, Should Courts
Buy the Proposed Restatement?, TRIAL, November 1996, at 23, 28. See also Mark
McLaughlin Hager, Don't Say I Didn't Warn You (Even Though I Didn't): Why the
Pro-Defendant Consensus On Warning Law is Wrong, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1125, 1134
(1994) (arguing that the description of "failure to warn" inevitably suggests
conduct, i.e., negligence, the recommending that warning law should be renamed
to "hidden danger," reorienting attention away from conduct and back to a product
conceptualization that is intact with manufacturing defect).
222 That the black letter law in both the design and inadequate warning formu-
lations is almost identical. The Reporter throughout the comments and notes of the
Restatement (Third) remark that design and warning defects are similar in many
aspects. Discussing the relationship between design and warning, defects, the Re-
porters believe that "both aim at achieving higher levels of safety in the use and
consumption of products." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. 1. Moreover, the Report-
ers highlight the fact that product instructions and warnings "are relevant to the
question of defective design." Id. cmt. (1). The Reporters explain that although a
product may be found to be nondefective because of adequate warning and instruc-
tion, the same product may be found defective in design. See id. § 2 cmt. k. They
continue that "when a safer design can reasonably be implemented, adoption of the
safer design is preferable to a warning that leaves a residuum of risk." Id. § 2 cmt.
k. Thus, in the unavailability of a reasonable alternative design situation, ade-
quate warnings or instructions will suffice to render the product reasonably safe.
See id. The Reporters also stress, on the one hand, that an open and obvious risk
"often serves the same function as a warnings", and on the other hand, the obvi-
ousness of a risk "does not necessarily obviate a duty to provide a safer design."
Therefore, the Reporters concluded their premise, "Ulust as warnings may be ig-
nored, so many obvious or generally known risks may be ignored, leaving a resid-
uum of risk great enough to require adopting a safer design." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) § 2 cmt. k. It is repeatedly noted throughout the Reporter Comments and
Note's that most of the applicable observations pertaining to design defects apply
to warning defects. Thus, the reader will notice similarities in my examination of
design and warning defect, whilst the differences will be exemplified.
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instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably
safe."2 23
A seller must provide reasonable instructions or warnings
about his product's foreseeable risks. 224 The Reporters explain
that instructions "inform users how to use products safely" and
"warnings alert users ... to product risks."225 In turn, instruc-
tions and warnings "can prevent harm either by appropriate
conduct during use or consumption or by choosing not to use or
consume."226 In addition, the Reporters opine that warnings
should "inform users and consumers of non-obvious risks that
unavoidably inhere in using or consuming the product."227 The
Reporters believe that reasonably foreseeable consumers can
avoid the non-obvious risk and make an "informed decision" to
purchase or not to purchase the product. 228 The Reporters, how-
ever, limit warnings and instructions to where "reasonably fore-
223 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2c.
224 See id. § 2 cmt. i. For a comprehensive review regarding duty to warn see
M. Stuart Madden, The Duty To Warn In Products Liability: Contours and Criti-
cism, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 221, 234 (1987) (conceptualizing warning law as a correc-
tion to the "imbalance between the product-related information available to the
consumer and that available to the manufacture," following this imbalance or
asymmetry methodology, finding that "identification of a material disparity in ger-
mane safety-related information known to the seller as opposed to that known to
the injured claimant will, with only limited exceptions, predict seller liability for
inadequate warnings or instructions").
225 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. i.
226 Id. § 2 cmt. i, see also David Owen, supra note 1, at 762 (explaining that
safety information promotes two objectives: (1) "individual autonomy," that is con-
sumer choice in purchasing or not purchasing a product in light of information
about the product's risks; and (2) "optimal" safety, that is, the available informa-
tion helps the consumer to reduce or minimize risks accordingly).
227 Id. § 2 cmt. i.
228 Id. But see Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive
Limitations, 41 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1193 (1994) (examining warning law from a be-
havioral discourse, Rational Risk Calculator (holds that consumers can weight the
personal benefits and costs of risky activity and chose the level of risk to accept)
with Mistake and Momentary Inattention (holds that consumer's cognitive capac-
ity is limited and as such is not able to assess the risk in a "rational" manner, i.e.,
there is an "intrinsic limitations on people's capacity to make optimal choices"),
concluding that "reasonable behavior" is incompatible with actual consumer be-
havior and as such "good" warning are not a substitute for safer design and mar-
keting strategies); see also Howard Latin, Behavioral Criticisms of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 16 J. PROD. LiAB. & Toxic 209, 211 (1994)
(arguing that social science research has convincingly demonstrated that accident
causing behavior is, to a great extent, unavoidable due to the "inherent cognitive
limitations and from intrinsic physical or personality attributes").
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seeable product users and consumers 229 would deem material
significant in deciding whether to use or consume the prod-
uct."230 Unless the risks presented by the product would have
been reduced by the adoption of reasonable instructions or
warnings, the Reporters assert, "liability for failure to warn
does not attach."23 1
What risks is the manufacturer obliged to warn against?
The Reporters clearly state in the black letter law that the man-
ufacturer is liable only for foreseeable risks. They believe that
unforeseeable risk "by definition cannot specifically be warned
against."232 Thus, in design and inadequate warnings defect
cases, the Reporters maintain, the plaintiff bears the "burden of
establishing that the risk in question was known or should have
been known to the relevant manufacturing community."233 "Of
course," assert the Reporters, "the manufacturer must conduct
adequate testing before marketing the product."234
As in design defects, the Reporters acknowledge that sec-
tion 2(c) "adopts a reasonableness test for judging the adequacy
of product instructions and warnings." 235 To guide the courts,
the Reporters enumerate several factors to be used to determine
reasonableness of the inadequate warning or instruction. In as-
sessing adequacy of the warning or instructions, the Reporters
direct courts to focus "on various factors, such as content and
comprehensibility, intensity of expression, and the characteris-
tics of expected user groups."236 The Reporters caution, how-
229 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. j (acknowledging that "[wiarnings con-
cerning risks of allergic reactions that are not reasonably foreseeable at the time of
sale need not be provided").
230 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. (h) (1997). Interestingly, the Reporters
stress that "if it is determined that a particular user or consumer would have de-
cided to use or consume even if warned, the lack of warnings is not a legal cause of
that plaintiffs harm." Id.
231 Id. § 2 cmt. p.
232 Id. § 2 cmt. m.
233 Id.
234 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. m.
235 Id. § 2 cmt. i. The Reporters acknowledge that "[a]lthough the liability
standard is formulated in essentially identical terms ... the defectiveness concept
is more difficult to apply in the warnings context." Id.
236 Id. cmt. i. See, e.g., Madden, supra note 224, at 223, 311 (listing five factors
to be evaluated to determine adequacy of warning: "(1) the dangerousness of the
product; (2) the form in which the product is used; (3) the intensity and form of the
warnings given; (4) the burdens to be imposed by requiring warnings; and (5) the
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ever, that "[i]t is impossible to identify anything approaching a
perfect level of detail that should be communicated in product
disclosures." 237
As in design defects, the Reporters state that warning de-
fects "require determinations that the product could have rea-
sonably been made safer by a better design or instruction or
warning."238 Sections 2(b) and 2(c), the Reporters continue,
"4rely on a reasonableness test traditionally used in determining
whether an actor has been negligent."239 The appropriate rules
in a warning defect case, according to the Reporters, should be
"[s]ome sort of independent assessment of relevant advantages
and disadvantages, to which some attach the label 'risk-utility
balancing.' 240 At the outset, the Reporters acknowledge that
although design and warning rules are almost identical, "the
defectiveness concept is more difficult to apply in the warning
context."241 Although the Reporters maintain that the risk-util-
ity test "nicely describes the decisional calculus that lies at the
heart of products liability law," they admit that a risk-utility
analysis that excessively relies on producing "right" answers
may be problematic. 242
likelihood that the particular warnings will be adequately communicated to those
who will foreseeably use the product").
237 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. i.
238 Id. § 1 cmt. a.
239 Id. § 1 cmt. a. See also § 2 cmt (a) (noting that the "risk-utility balancing"
approach "achieve[s] the same general objectives as does liability predicted on
negligence")
240 Id. § 2 cmt. a. See also id. § 2 cmt. f. The main factors are "magnitude and
probability of the foreseeable risks of harm" "strength of consumer expectations,"
and the "relative advantages and disadvantages" of the alteration considering
"production costs, product longevity, maintenance, repair, and esthetics." Id.
Many commentators have observed that risk-utility analysis is applied to warning
defect cases. See Mark Geistfeld, Inadequate Product Warnings and Causation, 30
U. MICH. L.J. REFORM 309 (1997) at 327 (examining the Restatement (Third), stat-
ing that "[tihe standard for evaluating a warning is based on the risk-utility test"
and to recover "the plaintiff must show that the seller did not provide a specific
warning or instruction that satisfies this test"); but see Paul D. Rheingold and Su-
san B. Feinglass, Risk-Utility Analysis in the Failure to Warn Context, 30 U. MICH
L.J. REFORM 353, 355-356 (1997) (responding to the argument that risk-utility is
applicable by association to warning defect: "Not only is the black letter statement
devoid of such language, neither the comments nor the Reporter's Notes indicates
that a judge or jury should consider such an analysis in determining whether a
warning was adequate").
241 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. i.
242 Id. Reporters Notes on § 2 cmt. a.
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Whether a reasonably foreseeable consumer would have
followed the warnings, determines if the omission thereof would
result in seller's liability. The Reporters clearly state that if the
consumer would have bought or used the product regardless of
the lack of warning, "the lack of warnings is not a legal cause of
that plaintiffs harm."243
In the open and obvious risk arena, the Reporters assert
that no duty exists to "warn or instruct regarding risks and risk
avoidance measures that should be obvious to, or generally
known by, foreseeable product users."244 Unlike in design defect
situations where the open and obviousness of a risk does not
prevent liability, 245 the open and obvious nature of a product,
according to the Reporters, is a defense to an inadequate warn-
ing claim. 246 It is the understanding of the Reporters that
"[wihen a risk is obvious or generally known, the prospective
addressee of a warning will or should already know of its exist-
ence." 247 It follows, therefore, that a warning of an obvious risk
243 Id. § 2 cmt. i.
244 Id. § 2 cmt. j. See Maneely v. General Motors Corporation, 108 F.3d 1176,
1179 (Cal. 1997 ) (citing with approval the Restatement provision regarding the
non-existence of a duty to warn or instruct regarding open and obvious risks).
245 See id. § 2 cmt. f. The Reporters point out that the open and obviousness of
a risk which the consumer expects does not "prevent a finding that the design is
defective." Id. "The mere fact that a risk presented by a product design is open and
obvious, or generally known, and that the product thus satisfies expectations, does
not prevent a finding that the design is defective." Id. See also § 2 cmt. c which
explicitly states that the "obviousness of a design related risk" does not preclude a
finding of defectiveness.
246 See id. § 2 cmt. j. "The obviousness of risk may bear on the issues of design
defect rather than failure to warn." Id. Unlike in the case of design defect where
open and obvious risks are not a defense, open and obvious risks are a defense in
an inadequate warning defect case. See also, § 2 cmt c. Commentators agree. See,
e.g., Madden, supra note 224, at 253 ("The majority rule is that there exists no
duty to warn of certain obviously hazardous conditions"); see also Owen, supra note
1, at 779 (stating that "the obviousness of a product danger often properly contin-
ues to play a decisive no-duty role, as many courts have held"). But see Rheingold
& Feinglass, supra note 240, 362 (arguing the concept of obviousness is relative,
and, as such, "the product supplier should be required to issue warnings to all
types of persons, even if the risks would be apparent to some" opining that "[a] fter
all, the warnings serve as reminder to all users"); Latin, supra note 228, at 217
(criticizing the Reporters' positions on open and obvious, arguing that "the Report-
ers offer no guidance on just how obvious a risk must be before courts should hold
as a matter of law that warnings need not mention the risk").
247 RESTATEMENT (THiRD) § 2 cmt. j. See also Owen, supra note 1, at 779 (claim-
ing the Restatement view "makes good sense," noting if one already is aware of the
danger or risk, the "informational goals of a warning have been fulfilled").
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"in most instances will not provide an effective additional mea-
sure of safety."248 The issue of whether the risk was obvious or
generally known is a question of fact to be decided by the trier of
fact.249
Remarking upon the intent of comment (), 25 0 the Reporters
admit that a manufacturer does not have a duty to warn about
obvious dangers, "but reject the position that the obviousness of
a danger is an automatic defense to a design defect claim."25 1
The Reporters' examination of open and obvious dangers re-
flects the majority jurisdictions. 252 One commentator, although
taking exception with most of the Restatement (Third), de-
scribed the open and obvious commentary as "unexceptiona-
ble."253 The Reporters make clear that liability attaches in
design and warning claims "only when the product is put to
uses that it is reasonable to expect a seller or distributor to fore-
248 Id. § 2 cmt. j. The Reporters claim that "requiring warnings of obvious or
generally known risks reduces the efficacy of warnings generally." Id. See also
Madden, supra note 224, 253 (discussing obviousness of a risk, opining that "there
exists in most instances an equilibrium between the safety-related information
held by the seller and that known by the buyer or user, and there should be no
duty to warn").
249 See id. § 2 cmt. j.
250 Id.
251 Id. Reporters Notes § 2 cmt. i. See also id. § 2 cmt. i. "The fact that a risk is
obvious or generally known often serves the same function as a warning. However,
obviousness of risk does not necessarily obviate a duty to provide a safer design.
Just as warnings may be ignored, so may obvious or generally known risks be ig-
nored, leaving a residuum of risk great enough to require adopting a safer design."
Id. See also Caterpillar, Inc. v. Shears et al, 911 S.W.2d 379, 383-384 (Tx. 1995)
(describing, in dicta, their holding that liability for a design defect "may attach
even if the defect is apparent" as consistent with the position taken under the Re-
statement (Third)). Commentators agree. See Madden, supra note 224, at 222 (in-
sisting that "if there is shown a manufacturer's duty to redesign, that duty should
not be discharged merely by providing warnings concerning the misdesign"); see
also Latin, supra note 228, at 1279-1280 ("[e]ven if the obvious nature of the risk
should insulate manufacturers from liability in failure-to-warn cases, a "good"
warning about an obvious risk should not shield a badly designed product from
liability on a design theory").
252 See SHAPO, supra note 134, 9.14(1) ("[there are many decisions that
would subscribe to the proposition that 'injuries are not compensable if they are
caused by inherent propensities of a product which are obvious to all who come
into contact with them . . . '" (footnotes omitted)). For an interesting survey of the
application of the open and obvious defense in numerous product see id. at IT
19.11(1)-19(11)(2)(a) (among the products surveyed, swimming pools, automobiles,
motorcycles, low ceilings, football helmets electricity, slipperiness of ice, slow
cooker appliance, refrigerated trailer, lawnmower, industrial machines).
253 Shapo, supra note 134, at 681.
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see."254 Clearly, 'foreseeable use' does not include "every con-
ceivable mode of use and abuse."255
The issues of misuse, modification, and alteration are dealt
with in comment p to section 2. These are "forms of post sale
conduct by product users" and are relevant for the determina-
tion of defect and causation.256 Most important, misuse goes to
the heart of causation. That is, the misuse may be considered an
intervening cause relieving the manufacturer from liability,
both in design and warning cases.257 The Reporters emphasize
that the concept of foreseeable misuse and modification "must
also be considered in deciding whether an alternative design
should have been adopted."258 The Reporters note that a prod-
uct may be found defective and be the cause of plaintiffs injury,
but if the plaintiff misused the product, comparative responsi-
bility doctrine would reduce his recovery. 259
Acknowledging that warnings may be ineffective due to
consumer inattention or insufficient motivation to follow the in-
structions, the Reporters strongly assert that "when a safer de-
sign can reasonably be implemented, adoption of the safer
design is preferable to a warning that leaves a residuum of
risk. '260 When reasonable alternative designs cannot be reason-
ably implemented, the Reporters believe that "adequate in-
254 Id. § 2 cmt. m. (stating that the duty to warn "extends to all risk-creating
misuse that is reasonably foreseeable").
255 Id. The Reporters indicate that a manufacturer has no duty to design or
warn against the post sale conduct of a user when such post sale conduct "may be
so unreasonable and costly to avoid." Id. § 2 cmt. o. See also id. cmt. m. It is not
required, the Reporter emphasize, for manufacturers to increase "the costs of de-
signing and marketing products in order to avoid the consequences of unreasona-
ble modes of use." Id. See also Madden, supra note 224, at 270 (arguing that "the
informational duty should not require one to warn about what cannot be
imagined").
256 RESTATEMENT (THiRD) § 2 cmt. p. (1997). "It follows that misuse, modifica-
tion, and alteration are not discrete legal issues. Rather, when relevant, they are
aspects of the concepts of defect, causation, and plaintiffs fault." Id.
257 Id. § 2 p. See also § 15 on causation and § 17 comparative responsibility.
258 Id. § 2 cmt. p. See SHAPO, supra note 134, 21.02(3)(a). "For many courts,
'foreseeability' of 'misuse' is sufficient to overcome defenses constructed on the
foundation that a plaintiff did not use a product in the intended way." Id.. See
MADDEN, supra note 10, § 8.4, at 307. "The contemporary view is that a manufac-
turer has a duty to design a product reasonably safe for reasonably foreseeable
misuse." Id.
259 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 CMT. P.
260 Id. § 2 cmt. 1.
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structions and warnings will suffice to render the product non-
defective."261
Although the instructions and warnings are usually from
the manufacturers, "sellers down the chain of distribution must
warn when doing so is feasible and reasonably necessary. "262
Whether a supplier of a product for use by others through an
intermediary has a duty to warn the ultimate user directly, the
Reporters concede, there is no clear-cut answer except that the
standard "is one of reasonableness in the circumstances."
263
The Reporters do offer various factors to be considered in this
situation: "the gravity of the risks posed by the product, the
likelihood that the intermediary will convey the information to
the ultimate user, and the feasibility and effectiveness of giving
a warning directly to the user."264
Finally, like in design defect claims, plaintiff bares the bur-
den of proving that adequate instructions or warning were not
provided."265 As in the case of all three types of defect, the defec-
tive condition of the product must have caused the harm to the
plaintiff.266 Courts267 and commentators alike have long ob-
served that the duty to warn under negligence and strict liabil-
ity are "almost indistinguishable; '268 that is, "negligence and
261 Id.
262 Id. § 2 cmt. i.
263 Id.
264 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. i.
265 Id.
266 See id. § 2 cmt. p.
267 See, e.g., Feldman v. Lederle Labs, 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984); Brown v. Su-
perior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988); Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass
Corp., 810 P.2d 549 (Cal. 1991).
268 See MADDEN, supra note 224, 242-243 (illustrating that both under negli-
gence and strict liability the focus is on the extent the product poses an unreasona-
ble danger to the user (or bystander), i.e., the "degree of risk," "severity of injury"
and the "number of people to be injured" by the product, concluding that "the func-
tional characteristics of strict liability and negligence theories are almost indistin-
guishable"). See also SHAPo, supra note 134, at 19.09(2)(c) & (d). "One should
observe that judicial opposition to employing strict liability for failure to warn
leaves considerable running room for a straight negligence action on that basis.
Some courts have gone so far as to contrast explicitly the duty to warn as it exists
under section § 402A - characterizing the main issue under the formulation as
whether the product is unreasonably dangerous - with section 388 of the Second
Restatement, which articulates a conventional negligence duty to warn based on
the supplier's knowledge or reason to know of the risk." Id. But see Hager, supra
note 221, at 1131-1132 (claiming the view that negligence and strict liability are
the same is "ill founded" and that such a view is based on three reasons: (1) a "false
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strict liability, doctrine, have converged."269 The Restatement
(Third)'s negligence approach, therefore, correctly restates the
law and reflects the weight of authority. 270 Many commentators
agree with the Restatement (Third) regarding warning law. On
the other hand, several courts and many commentators vehe-
mently contend, based entirely on public policy, 271 that the
manufacturer should be strictly liable for unforeseeable risks of
their products.27 2 Another commentator goes as far as advocat-
ing that a strict liability regime is the appropriate liability stan-
dard in all warning and instructions cases.273
The main flaw with the Restatement (Third)'s examination
of warning law is that by implication, it suggests that a risk-
utility test is applicable to warning defects, yet the Reporters do
not explain how this test works. The Reporters admit that it is
more difficult to apply risk-utility balancing in warning cases
analogy" that warning law is like design defects, where negligence principles pre-
vail; (2) that the term "failure to warn" suggests "faulty conduct" and as such "neg-
ligence logic is deemed intrinsic to the concept 'failure to warn;'" and (3)
"thoughtless repetition of previous authority insisting that strict liability has no
meaning for warning law distinct from negligence").
269 John Wade recognized long ago that there is no difference between negli-
gence and strict liability in warning cases. See John Wade, supra note 124, at 842.
For decisional law grappling with warning law, is it negligence or strict liability?
See generally SHAPo, supra note 134, T 19.09(3)(a) - 19.09(3)(e) (describing an
Illinois Supreme Court decision as "[a]n important attempt to harmonize the theo-
ries, canted in the direction of negligence ...").
270 See Owen, supra note 1, at 763. "And the Restatement agrees with the
nearly universal view that manufacturers should not be obligated to warn of risks
that cannot be foreseen. What is left of warning "defectiveness" is only negligence,
nothing more." Id. But see generally Hager, supra note 221, at 1125 (1994) (ac-
knowledging the consensus view that in design defects cases the "deficiency circles
back to conduct deficiency," but claiming this position is "ill founded").
271 It is believed that manufactures are in a better position to spread the cost
and compensate those injured from their products, although not negligent. For pol-
icy considerations favoring a strict liability regime see, e.g., Sternhagen v. Dow
Company, 935 P.2d 1139, 1143-1144 (Mo. 1997).
272 See, e.g., Sternhagen, 935 P.2d at 1147 (rejecting the Restatement (Third)'s
foreseeable risks limitation of liability holding that "in a strict liability case,
knowledge of any undiscovered or undiscoverable dangers should be imputed to
the manufacturer" and concluding that "in a strict products liability case, state-of-
the-art evidence is not admissible to establish whether the manufacturer knew or
through the exercise of reasonable human foresight should have known of the
danger").
273 See generally Hager, supra note 221 (renaming "failure to warn" to "hidden
defect" and advocating strict liability by shifting the focus from conduct to
product).
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than it is in design cases, but they do not offer any guidance.
One commentator has discerned the distinction between risk-
utility analysis in design and warning defects. 274 Madden dis-
cerned that the main difference between risk-utility analysis in
warning defect and design defect "pertain to the burden of pre-
caution element of the equation" - the cost variable in the equa-
tion.275 Unlike in warning defect cases, in design defect cases,
the cost of altering the design of a product may be substantial
undermining the product's economic viability or may substan-
tially diminish the product's utility.276 However, creating warn-
ings or instructions for a product to improve upon an existing
one is always possible.27 7 Unlike the cost of an alternative de-
sign, the cost of an improved warning is often negligible. 278 As
such, when a jury finds that an additional warning could have
prevented the injury, the plaintiff will almost always prevail.
The solution, according to one commentator, is to focus on the
cost incurred based on the "time and attention" required to read
and remember the various disclosures in a warning.27 9 Another
commentator rejects the notion that costs are negligible in
warning defects and insists that design and warning defects are
the same type of defect. 28 0 The cost variable in the risk-utility
analysis, according to Davis, is determined by applying a cost
concept framework that includes direct cost,28 1 indirect cost,28 2
274 See MADDEN, supra note 224, at 241.
275 Id. This refers to Learned Hand's B<PL equation.
276 See Jankowski, supra note 153, at 329. "A commonly held judicial assump-
tion is that all additional warnings effectively reduce the risk of harm to the user
while not causing a material decrease in the product's utility." Id.
277 See MADDEN, supra note 224, at 241-242.
278 See, e.g., Eagle-Pitcher Indus, Inc. v. Balbos, 578 A.2d 228, 255 (MD 1990)
(asserting that if adequate warning would require more printing on a label, favor
weighs on plaintiff); Dambacher v. Mallis, 485 A.2d 408, 427 n. 7 (PA. 1984) (stat-
ing that risk-utility analysis, unlike in design defects, is not suitable for warning
defect because "the utility of a product will remain constant whether or not a warn-
ing is added, but the risk will not"). For a survey of decisional law on the issue of
cost see SHAPO, supra note 138, at 19.08.
279 Geistfel, supra note 240, at 322.
280 See generally Ralph D. Davis, Different Treatment of Marketing and Design
Defects in Pure Risk-Utility Balancing: Who's the Villain?, 27 Am. Bus. L.J. 41
(1989) (arguing that design and warning defects are the same and the belief that
the cost of warning is cheap and easy is a "myth").
281 Direct cost "are costs that flow uninterrupted to and from the product and
any element of the product." Id. at 58.
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opportunity cost 283 and perverse cost. 284 Another commentator
tackles the cost problem from a pure supply and demand ap-
proach.28 5 Viscusi argues that when a consumer becomes aware
of more hazards to the product than earlier believed, the con-
sumer's demand and willingness to pay for the product would
drop, and the manufacturer's profits would decrease. 28 6 Yet, an-
other commentator offers his algebraic spin on the cost variable
arguing that to determine the associated cost of an alternative
warning (R), the decrease in probability of risk minimizing be-
havior (P) should be multiplied "by the magnitude of harm asso-
ciated with that event L = PL."28 7 Others have rejected the
applicability of the risk-utility analysis in warning defects, alto-
gether, describing it as "misplaced" and overly pro-
defendant. 288
Despite the fact that the Restatement (Third) correctly re-
states warning law as it stands today, it did not make it any
clearer. Warning law jurisprudence in itself is flawed. Courts
analyzing a warning defect claim should take into account the
findings of social science research that concluded that people's
cognitive abilities are limited by numerous factors such as
282 Indirect costs "are costs that flow circuitously to and from the product and
any element of the product." Id. at 59.
283 Opportunity costs "include foregone beneficial alternatives that the imple-
mentation of safety necessarily precludes. Id. at 59.
284 Perverse costs "safety measure-related costs that result in outcomes which
not only fail to advance, but are actually adverse to, manufacturer, consumer/user,
and societal interests." Id. at 58-62.
285 See Kip W. Viscusi, Wading Through the Muddle of Risk-Utility Analysis,
39 Am. U. L. REV 573, 602-606 (1990).
286 See id. at 603-604.
287 Janowski, supra note 153, at 336 (proposing in design and warning defect
cases a risk-utility analysis that first "qualifies the alternative as reasonable" in
the context of technological and practical feasibility and then engages in a "risk-
utility balancing accomplished through a consideration of the level of increase or
decrease in risk posed by the proffered alternative").
28 See, e.g., Dambacher, 485 A.2d 408, 427 (1984) (risk-utility is not appropri-
ate for warning). See also Rheingold & Feinglass, supra note 240, at 353 (conclud-
ing that warning law requires a "straight-forward legal standard" and that risk-
utility is not such standard nor would it "function as an effective tool in the warn-
ings area because it provides no guidelines for manufacturers on how to increase
the quality of warnings"); see also Schwartz, supra note 113, at 402 (complaining of
Reporters' pro-defendant bias in section 2(c) on two grounds: (1) the Reporters'
rejection of the "heeding presumption," and (2) the Reporter shifting of the burden
of proof to the defendant on the issue of the manufacturer's knowledge of risk).
328
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memory, mistakes and personality. 28 9 The paramount signifi-
cance of this research was demonstrated, quite convincingly, by
Howard Latin's UCLA Law Review article. In short, inadequate
warning or instruction jurisprudence must incorporate these so-
cial sciences discoveries to insure a fair and rational products
liability regime.
(4) Prescription Drugs
An examination of the concept of defectiveness is not com-
plete without examining where prescription drugs and medical
devices position under the new Restatement. Since the mid
1960's, prescription drugs were treated within the ambit of
§ 402A's comment k.290 An overwhelming majority of jurisdic-
tions have adopted comment k.291 Comment k provided that a
289 See Latin, supra note 228, at 211. "If cognitive mistakes, confusion, mo-
mentary inattention, illiteracy, excessive optimism, forgetfulness, clumsiness, and
other forms of sub-optimal user behavior occur very frequently and are largely un-
avoidable and inevitable, products liability doctrine should be tailored in light of
realistic behavioral characterizations." Id. see also generally Latin, supra note 228.
290 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A cmt. k (1964).
Unavoidably unsafe product. There are some products which, in the pres-
ent state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for
their intended and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field
of drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment
of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging con-
sequences when it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a
dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully
justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk which they
involve. Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper
directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.
The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of
which for this very reason cannot legally be sold except to physicians, or
under the prescription of a physician. It is also true in particular of many
new or experimental drugs as to which, because of lack of time and oppor-
tunity for sufficient medical experience, there can be no assurance of
safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such experience as
there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a
medically recognizable risk. The seller of such products, again with the
qualification that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper
warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict
liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely because
he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful and
desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.
Id.
291 See, e.g, Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (1988). "We are aware of
only one decision that has applied the doctrine of strict liability to prescription
drugs . . . [m]ost cases have embraced the rule of comment k . . . ."). Id. See also
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manufacturer of an "unavoidably unsafe" product was, to a
great extent, immune from strict liability. Courts have almost
entirely, applied comment k's concept of "unavoidably unsafe"
to prescription drugs, vaccines, and medical devices. 292 This
"unavoidably unsafe" cocoon reached its metamorphoses under
the Restatement (Third). In accord with developing law, which
has treated prescription drugs differently than other products,
the new Restatement allocates a special section for prescription
drugs and medical devices. Section 6 addresses liability of sell-
ers for harm caused by defective prescription drugs and medical
devices. 293 Subsection (a) sets up the liability standard as fol-
lows: "A manufacturer of a prescription drug or medical device
who sells or otherwise distributes a defective drug or medical
device is subject to liability for harm to a person caused by the
defect." Postulating the underpinnings of any liability system,
this section provides that persons harmed due to defective
drugs or medical devices will have a cause of action to recover
for damages. The heart of the issue is what is meant by the con-
cept of defect as it pertains to prescription drugs and medical
devices.
Subsection (b) proceeds to provide that a prescription drug
or medical device is defective, "at the time of sale or other distri-
bution," if it "contains a manufacturing defect" within the
meaning of section 2(a), or "is not reasonably safe" due to its
defective design within the meaning of section 6(c), or "is not
reasonably safe" due to inadequate instructions or warnings
MADDEN, supra note 10, § 23.11, at 113-114 (finding that the majority of jurisdic-
tions have adopted comment k); but see Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189
(Alaska 1992) (refusing to adopt comment k); see also Hill v. Searle Lab., 884 F.2d
1064 (8th Cir 1989) (refusing to extend IUD, comment k protection, holding that
comment k's unavoidably unsafe "exception would only apply upon a showing of
exceptional social need").
292 See Brook v. Medtronic, Inc. 750 F.2d 1227 (4th Cir. 1984) (pace maker);
Racer v. Utterman, 629 S.W.2d 387 (Mo. 1992) (anti bacterial surgical drape);
Hufft v. Horowitz, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 377 (Cal. 1992) (penal implants). See also SHAPO,
supra note 134, at 19.07(9)(b). "There is specific authority on the proposition
that no significant distinction exists between prescription devices and drugs with
respect to the duty to warn." Id. See also Cupp, supra note 139, at 78, 82 (1994)
(citing authority to the effect that courts "most often" and "most frequently" apply
comment k to prescription drugs, vaccines, and medical devices).
293 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 6. For purpose of section 6 a prescription drug
or medical device "is one that may be legally sold or otherwise distributed only
pursuant to a health care provider's prescription." Id. § 6(a).
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within the meaning of section 6(d). The concept of defect as it
pertains to prescription drugs and medical devices, like other
products, is "trifurcated." While the concept of defective manu-
facturing falls within the parameters outlined in section 2, de-
sign and inadequate warnings are subject to new guidelines.
(a) Manufacturing defect
If a drug or medical device "departs from its intended de-
sign even though all possible care was exercised in the prepara-
tion and marketing of the product" the manufacturer is liable
for harm suffered. 294 This section clearly subjects a manufactur-
ing defect to strict liability, i.e. liability will attach "even though
all possible care was exercised." 295 There is unanimous agree-
ment favoring strict liability in the case of a manufacturing de-
fect.296 Given that the limitations on the liability standard in
design defects are not supported in the case of manufacturing
defects, claim the Reporters, liability for manufacturing defects
in prescription drugs and medical devices, is the same liability
standard for commercial sellers of other products. 297 This sec-
tion clearly has the weight of decisional law. 298
(b) Design defect
Unlike manufacturing defects, there is more to consider re-
garding design defects. Section 6(c) provides that
A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due to
defective design if the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug
or medical device are sufficiently great in relation to its foresee-
294 Id. § 2(a).
295 Id. § 2(a) cmt. b. "The rule for manufacturing defects stated in § 2(a) im-
poses liability whether or not the manufacturer's quality control efforts satisfy
standards of reasonableness." Id.
296 See, e.g., Phillips v. Kimwood, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974). See also Owen, supra
note 1, at 748 (contending that strict liability for manufacturing defects, embodied
or incorporated in the Restatement (Third), is "where almost all agree that it
belongs").
297 See id. § 6 cmt. c.
298 See MADDEN, supra note 10, § 23.3, at 353. Madden lists the following ex-
amples where manufacturer liability was found to attach: wrong formula; wrong
ingredient; omission of ingredient(s); incorrect process; incorrect label; "[iun all
these cases the product is truly defective, and liability attaches to the manufac-
turer under all of the usual rules including that of Restatement (Second), § 402A."
Id. It appears as "truly defective" is synonymous to "manufacturing defect." Id.
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able therapeutic benefits that reasonable health care providers,
knowing of such foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would
not prescribe the drug or medical device for any class of
patients. 29 9
Unlike manufacturing defects, design defects conform to the
manufacturer's unit specifications. The black letter law estab-
lishes a balancing test for prescription drug and medical devices
- liability will attach only when "risks of harm so far outweigh
its therapeutic benefits that reasonable, properly informed
health care providers would not prescribe it."300 The Reporters
justify their special attention to prescription drugs and medical
devices with the notion that, unlike other products, "a prescrip-
tion drug or medical device entails a unique set of risks and
benefits." For this reason, the Reporters explain, courts tradi-
tionally have refused to "impose tort liability for defective de-
signs of prescription drugs and medical devices." 301 The
Reporters continue, "What may be harmful to one patient may
be beneficial to another."30 2 Based on this observation, the Re-
porters emphasize that a drug is defectively designed "only
when it provides no net benefit to any class of patients."30 3
The Reporters also believe "that the regulatory system gov-
erning prescription drugs is a legitimate mechanism for setting
the standards for drug design. 30 4 The Reporters explain this
"deference" is due to the courts' concern "over the possible nega-
tive effects of judicially imposed liability on the cost and availa-
bility of valuable medical technology."30 5 The Reporters further
exhort that this deference rests on two assumptions. First, "that
the prescribing health care providers, when adequately in-
formed by drug manufacturers, are able to assure that the right
drugs and medical devices reach the right patients," and sec-
ond, "that governmental regulatory agencies adequately review
new prescription drugs and devices, keeping unreasonably dan-
gerous designs off the market."30 6 The Reporters rightfully note
299 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) §6(c).
300 Id. § 6 cmt. a.
301 Id. § 6 cmt. b.
302 Id.
303 Id.
304 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 6 cmt. 6.
305 Id.
306 Id.
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that many courts find "unqualified deference to these regulatory
mechanism[s]" as unjustified. The Reporters admit that "an ap-
proved prescription drug or medical device can present signifi-
cant risks without corresponding advantages."30 7
The Reporters justify their great limitation of manufac-
turer liability with the notion that "manufacturers must have
ample discretion to develop useful drugs and devices without
subjecting their design decisions to the ordinary test applicable
to products generally under § 2(b)."30 8 Thus, prescription drug
or medical device design defects are subject to "a more rigorous
test for defect than does § 2(b)."30 9 Explaining the distinction
between design defect under section 2 and section 6, the Report-
ers state that for prescription drugs or medical devices the drug
or device must "have so little merit compared with its risks that
reasonable health care providers, possessing knowledge of risks
that were known or reasonably should have been known, would
not have prescribed the drug or device that has usefulness to
any class of patients, is not defective in design even if it is
harmful to other patients."310
The right drug or device will reach the right patient, ac-
cording to the Reporters, via learned intermediaries. A design is
defective, explain the Reporters, "when reasonable, informed
health care providers would not prescribe it to any class of pa-
tients - then the design of the product is defective and the
manufacturer should be subject to liability for the harm
caused."311 In the alternative, if the defendant establishes "one
or more contexts in which its product would be prescribed by
reasonable, informed health care providers" the design is not
307 Id.
308 Id. § 6 cmt. b.
309 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 6 cmt. b. Because of the special nature of prescrip-
tion drugs and medical devices, the determination of whether such products are
not reasonably safe is to be made under Subsections (c) and (d) rather than under
§§ 2(b) and 2(c)." Id. But see Vandall, supra 113, at 271 (explaining that not all
drugs and medical devices are "worthy of blanket protection" and that some drugs
do save lives while others like thalidomide, chloromycetin, MER/29, DES or
Oraflex cause damage, opining that the difference between prescription drugs and
other products, pertaining to design defects, "is artificial and arbitrary").
310 Id. § 6 cmt. b. See also § 6 cmt. f: The Reporters further emphasize that
section 6(c) stands for the proposition that "as longs as a given drug or device pro-
vides net benefits for a class of patients, it should be available to them, accompa-
nied by appropriate warnings and instructions." Id.
311 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 6 cmt. f.
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defective. 312 The Reporters caution, however, the fact that a
health care provider does in fact "prescribe defendant's product
does not in itself suffice to defeat plaintiff's claim."313 The Re-
porters provide a general outline to make sense of this position.
They maintain that the standard is an objective assessment of
whether a reasonable provider, "possessing the knowledge that
a reasonable drug manufacturer had or should have had about
the risks and benefits attendant to the use of the drug or medi-
cal device, would prescribe it for any class of patients."314 The
Reporters concede that this standard is extremely demanding.
They state that "[g]iven this very demanding objective stan-
dard, liability is likely to be imposed only under unusual cir-
cumstances."31 5 Many commentators describe this demanding
standard as unwarranted. 316
As with section 2, the liability standard applies only to
"risks of harm that are reasonably foreseeable at the time of
sale."31 7 The Reporters opine that imposing liability for unfore-
seeable risks, in addition to the fact that such risks cannot be
insured against, "can create inappropriate disincentives for the
development of new drugs and therapeutic devices." 318 The re-
sponsibility of drug and medical device manufacturers is to
"perform reasonable testing prior to marketing a product and to
discover risks and risk avoidance measures that such testing
would reveal."319 Thus, any harm resulting from unforeseen
risk will go uncompensated. 320
312 Id.
313 Id.
314 Id.
315 Id.
316 See Schwartz, surpa note 113, at 407 (charging that this standard has no
"precedent in case law" and calling the standard "super" negligence); Comment,
supra note 120, at 426. "Section 8(c) hinders the consumer's ability to show that a
drug is defective and increases the burden of proving that the manufacturer was
negligent in its decision to place the drug on the market." Id.
317 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 6 cmt. g.
318 Id. The Reporters continue: "Nor could such liability be adequately insured
against prior to the discovery of the products' harm-causing propensities, given the
fact that actuaries cannot accurately assess unknown and unknowable risks." Id.
See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988).
319 Id. § 6 cmt. g.
320 See also id. §2 cmt (m) (stating that as long as reasonable testing was con-
ducted, "[tihe harms that result from unforeseeable risks - - for example, in the
human body's reaction to a new drug, medical device, or chemical - - are not a basis
of liability"); see ,e.g., Carlin v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 1347 (Cal. 1996) (holding
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There are numerous problems with subsection 6(c). In addi-
tion to being a reasonable health care provider, the comments
clearly suggest that the health care provider must be "properly
informed." What "properly informed" encompasses, is not clear.
Given the emphasis on reasonableness, it will most likely be
based on a reasonableness standard. Another ambiguity is
whether a "health care provider" who is not "properly informed"
is liable for not being properly informed? According to the black
letter law, the manufacturer is liable if the health care provider
would not have prescribed the drug. What happens in the in-
stance where the health care provider prescribed a drug, that
should not have been prescribed? Is the health care provider
negligent? Would a plaintiff have a cause of action directly
against the health care provider, or limited to the manufac-
turer? Holding the manufacturer to the standard of a health
care provider will result in discrepancies and confusion. The
manufacturer should be held to a reasonable manufacturer
standard. The health care provider's prescription practice may
be relevant, but it is the manufacturer of the drug that should
be liable for defectively designed drugs or medical devices.
The health care provider standard has received much criti-
cism. Many commentators convincingly argue that there is no
precedent for the "health care provider" standard. 321 Moreover,
commentators cast doubt on the physician or health care pro-
vider's independent expertise regarding prescription drugs.322
manufacturer liable for failure to warn of risks of injury only to the extent that the
risks were either known or should have been known at the time of sale or manufac-
ture) ; see also Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988) (concluding that
"a manufacturer is not strictly liable for injuries caused by a prescription drug so
long as the drug was properly prepared and accompanied by warnings of its dan-
gerous propensities that were either known or reasonably scientifically knowable
at the time of distribution").
321 See generally Jeffrey D. Winchester, Comment, Section 8(c) of the Proposed
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Is It Really What the Doctor Ordered?, 82 CORNELL L.
REV. 644, 671-693 (1997) (finding no prescription drug case referring to the "rea-
sonable physician" or to the "reasonable health care provider" and demonstrating
that commentators and courts, alike, support a reasonable manufacturer stan-
dard); see also Teresa Moran Schwartz, Prescription Products and The Proposed
Restatement (Third), 61 TENN. L. REV. 1357, 1380 (1994) (arguing that the reason-
able physician standard has no precedent).
322 Schwartz sheds doubt on the physicians' independent expertise pertaining
to prescription drugs. In fact, she correctly emphasizes that "[miost health care
providers rely on manufacturer's extensive advertising, promotional programs,
mnd qales renresentatives to learn about products - - sources that do not always
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Most health care providers rely extensively on manufacturer's
representations regarding the safety level of a given drug. As
such, observers prefer a reasonable-manufacturer standard,
proffering that the manufacturer, not the physician, is in a bet-
ter position to inform health care providers of a drug's efficacy,
safety and risks.3 23 Interestingly, even the Reporters equate the
health care provider standard with that of a manufacturer. 324
The provisions of the Restatement (Third) pertaining to de-
fectively designed drugs and medical devices are overly harsh
on plaintiffs.325 Some have charged that the Reporters prescrip-
tion drug design provisions are "contrary to developing law."326
Although the policy of insuring innovation and incentive to de-
convey a complete, or even an accurate, picture of products risk. Another problem
is that doctors do not always stay up-to-date on available information." Schwartz,
supra note 113, at 408.
323 For an in-depth critique of the reasonable "health care provider" standard
see Comment, supra note 321, at 675.
324 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 6 cmt f. Discussing the liability standard in de-
sign defect cases, the Reporters state: "The issue is whether, objectively viewed,
reasonable providers, possessing the knowledge that a reasonable drug manufac-
turer had or should have had about the risks and benefits attendant to the use of
the drug or medical device, would prescribe it for any class of patients." (emphasis
added). Id.
325 See Schwartz, supra note 113, 408. "Not only does this standard increase
the already difficult evidentiary burden for plaintiffs who bring design claims in-
volving prescription products, it may pose initial problems of interpretation for the
courts." Id.
326 This charge is correct and incorrect. The problem the Reporters faced in the
design defect formulation is that courts have shied away from design defect liabil-
ity in prescription drug cases and only recently have begun to rely on this theory.
See Grunberg v. Upjohn Co. 813 P.2d 89, 92 (Utah 1991). See for an argument that
the Reporters design defect provision is contrary to law, Jerry J. Phillips, supra
note 127, at 142 (opining that prescription provision is contrary to developing law,
and "would essentially eliminate design liability for prescription drugs and medi-
cal devices"); Vandall, supra 113, 272 (exclaiming the Reporters did not consider
important case law but "[i]nstead, they take a clean sheet of paper and virtually
grant immunity to all drug and medical device manufacturers for defective design
cases[,] and [b]ecause of these omissions section 8(c) is void of precedent"). See also
Schwartz, Regulatory Standards and Products Liability: Striking the Right Bal-
ance Between the Two, 30 U. MICE. J.L. REFORM 431, 457-458 (1997) (asserting
that the prescription drug design defect standard has "no precedent in case law,
though agreeing that the Restatement (Third)'s standard for manufacturing and
warning in prescription drug defects reflect the majority jurisdiction"). But see
Brown, 751 P.2d 470 (exempting design defect drugs from liability based on policy
considerations for encouraging prescription drug development).
336
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velop new drugs is an important policy consideration,
327 it
should not trump consumer safety. Many observers believe that
a blanket-type protection of prescription drugs is not in the pub-
lic's interest. The fact of the matter is that many drugs will
have unavoidable risks. The consumer should be protected
against these risks. The manufacturer, who may profit hand-
somely from placing drugs in the market, is in a better position
to spread the cost than the consumer.
(c) Inadequate warning or instructions
Inadequate warnings or instructions is the quintessential
defect type implicated in prescription drug and medical device
cases. 328 Section (6)(d) provides that:
A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe be-
cause of inadequate instructions or warnings if reasonable in-
structions or warnings regarding foreseeable risks of harm are
not provided to:
(1) prescribing and other health care providers who are in a
position to reduce the risks of harm in accordance with the
instruction or warnings; or
(2) the patient when the manufacturer knows or has reason
to know that health care providers will not be in a position to
reduce the risks of harm in accordance with the instructions
or warnings.3 2 9
Section 6(e) proceeds to state that a retail seller or other
distributor of a prescription drug or medical device is subject to
liability for harm caused by the drug or device if:
(1) at the time of sale or other distribution the drug or medical
device contains a manufacturing defect as defined in s 2(a); or
327 See e.g., Brown, 751 P.2d 470 (asserting in design defect case, "if a manu-
facturer could not count on limiting its liability to risks that were known or knowa-
ble at the time of manufacture or distribution, it would be discouraged from
developing new and improved products for fear that later significant advances in
scientific knowledge would increase its liability . . ").
328 Failure to instruct or warn is the major basis of liability for See manufac-
turers of prescription drugs and medical devices. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 6
cmt. d. See also Madden, supra note 224, at 222. 'The duty to warn is perhaps the
most widely-employed claim in modern products liability litigation." Id.
.19 RE=T_A1Pflw (THIRD) § 6d.
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(2) at or before the time of sale or other distribution of the drug or
medical device the retail seller or other distributor fails to exer-
cise reasonable care and such failure causes harm to persons. 330
The Reporters note that section 6(d) sets forth the manufac-
turer's duty to warn of foreseeable risks to the prescribing
health care provider and in certain circumstances to directly
warn the patient.331 The duty to directly warn a patient arises
when the physician or other health care provider "has a much
diminished role as an evaluator or decision maker."332 The Re-
porters further explain that the manufacturer requires a direct
warning to the patient when drugs "are dispensed or adminis-
tered to patients without the personal intervention or evalua-
tion of a health care provider."333 Mass vaccine inoculations are
an example of a manufacturer's duty to directly warn the pa-
tient. However, the Reporters note that the duty to directly
warn the patient arises only if a direct warning "is feasible and
can be effective."334
Traditionally, the Reporters observe, warning has been "di-
rected to health care providers and not to patients."335 The Re-
statement (Third) retained the "learned intermediary" rule.
This "learned intermediary" approach, explain the Reporters,
rests on the understanding that only health care professionals
are qualified to appreciate the risks of a prescription drug and
weigh the relative advantages and disadvantages to advise
their patients accordingly. 336 The Reporters note that courts
330 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 6e.
331 See id. § 6 cmt. a. Section 6 "sets forth situations when a prescription drug
or medical device manufacturer is required to warn the patient directly of risks
associated with consumption or use of its products." Id. The manufacturer has a
duty to directly warn the patient when the "manufacturer knows or has reason to
know that health care providers will not be in a position to reduce the risks of
harm in accordance with the instructions or warnings." Id. § 6(d)(2).
332 Id. § 6 cmt. b.
333 Id. § 6 cmt e.
334 Id.
335 Id. § 6 cmt. b. See, e.g., SHAPo, supra note 134,1 19.07(9)(a)(ii). "Indeed, the
general rule on warnings about hazards associated with prescription drugs is that
they need only be communicated to the prescribing physician." See also MADDEN,
supra note 10, § 23.12, at 371 (noting that the rule that the physician is the person
to be warned "has been followed in a large number of cases").
336 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 6 cmt. b. "When prescribing health care provid-
ers are adequately informed of the relevant benefits and risks associated with vari-
ous prescription drugs and medical devices, they can reach appropriate decisions
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have carved-out two exceptions to the learned intermediary
rule. First, in the case of a governmental regulatory agency
mandating that patients be informed of risks pertaining to the
use of a drug; and second in the case of manufacturers advertis-
ing a prescription drug in the mass media. In both cases, regu-
lations require that the drugs be accompanied by appropriate
information concerning the risk.3 37 The Reporters, however,
state that the ALI does not sanction either exception but leaves
these and other exceptions to the development of case law.338
The Reporters rightfully observe that health care providers
cannot reduce the risk of harm in instances where there are un-
avoidable risks inherent in the drug or medical device. In these
instances, the manufacturer's duty to warn of such unavoidable
risks "allow the health care provider, and thereby the patient,
to make an informed choice whether to utilize the drug or medi-
cal device."339 In addition to this duty, the Reporters emphasize
that a drug or device manufacturer "may have a duty under the
law of negligence to use reasonable measures to supply instruc-
tions or warnings to non-prescribing health care providers who
are in positions to act on such information so as to reduce or
prevent injury to patients."340
Liability of manufacturers or learned intermediaries is lim-
ited by foreseeablity. Liability of manufacturers of prescription
drug or medical devices "arise only with respect to risks of harm
that are reasonably foreseeable at the time of sale. '3 41 The Re-
porters limitation of liability to foreseeable risks of harm is
based on two assumptions: (1) holding manufacturers liable for
unforeseeable risk would "create inappropriate disincentives for
the development of new drugs and therapeutic devices[;]" and
(2) manufacturers could not adequately insure against such un-
regarding which drug or device is best for specific patients." § 6 cmt. d. Thus the
Reporters contend, "[tihe duty then devolves on the health care provider to supply
to the patient such information as is deemed appropriate under the circumstances
so that the patient can make an informed choice as to therapy." Id. cmt b.
337 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 6 cmt. e.
338 See id.
339 Id. § 6 cmt. d.
340 Id.
341 Id. § 6 cmt. d. See, e.g., MADDEN, supra note 10, § 23.11, at 365. "The manu-
facturer's duty then is to warn of (1) Dangers of which he knows, and (2) Dangers
of which he should in the exercise of reasonable care know, if(3) Those dangers are
r.annablv to be foreseen in the use of the drug." Id.
339
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foreseeable risks.342 The manufacturer's responsibility, accord-
ing to the Reporters, is merely "to perform reasonable testing
prior to marketing a product."343
The prescription drug and medical device section has
drawn heavy criticism. Many commentators believe that the
pro-defendant provisions do not take in account the welfare of
consumers. 34 Although many commentators contend that the
prescription provisions do not have weight of authority,345
many others maintain that the weight of authority is on the Re-
statement (Third)'s side. 346 In the main, the Restatement
(Third) approach to prescription drugs and medical devices is
that of negligence. Indeed, commentators observed a decade ago
that attempting to distinguish the duty to warn under negli-
gence with the duty to warn under § 402A "is futile, as they are
practically the same. '347 Even if the Restatement (Third) re-
flects the majority of jurisdictions, many jurisdictions' common-
law devised rules to somewhat relieve the plaintiff from such a
wanting burden. For example, some courts give the plaintiff the
benefit of the heeding presumption,348 this was rejected by the
Reporters. Another example is the shifting from the plaintiff to
the defendant the burden of showing the manufacturer's knowl-
edge of the products' risks. With no doubt, recovery in prescrip-
342 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 6 cmt. g.
343 Id.
344 See, e.g., Vandall, supra note 113, at 270. "This proposal ignores the well-
developed common law policies regarding products liability: the consumer lacks
sophistication with regard to drugs; the loss should be placed on the manufacturer;
the seller/manufacturer can spread the loss; and the seller is the cheapest cost
avoided." Id.
345 See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 127, 142, (stating that prescription provision
is contrary to developing law and predicting it "would essentially eliminate design
liability for prescription drugs and medical devices"); see also Vandall, supra note
113, 270 (arguing that section 8(c) is "void of precedent"); Comment, supra note
120, 424 ("The Tentative Draft approach to prescription drugs is a new position
that differs substantially from any case law"); Cupp, supra note 139, at 108 ("The
new Restatement's non-drug design liability test - which is much closer to a true
restatement of existing case law than its prescription product design standard").
346 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 113, at 404 (1995) (taking exception with the
new standard for design defect but stating that "[tihe new standards generally
follow current common law rules for the first two categories of claims [manufactur-
ing and warning defects], but depart significantly from current rules for design
claims").
347 MADDEN, supra note 10, § 23.4, at 356.
348 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 113, at 404 (citing case law supporting the
heeding presumption).
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tion cases will be rare and as the Reporters themselves admit,
"unusual."
(V) PROPOSAL
The Restatement (Third) has not achieved a proper balance
between manufacturer interests and consumer interests. Un-
like its predecessor § 402A, the Restatement (Third) is pro-
manufacturer. With the minor exception of manufacturing de-
fect, the Restatement (Third) has established an ultra-negli-
gence liability standard for injuries caused by product defects.
Again, Cordozo's words of wisdom seem appropriate:
It is but a human impulse if the framers of a restatement are
tempted to declare the law not only as the past has shaped it in
judgments already rendered, but as the future ought to shape it in
cases yet to come. 3 4 9
It is clear that the Reporters of the Restatement (Third) have
restated the decisional law as closely as they could, but, indeed,
they have also restated the decisional law as they saw "the fu-
ture ought to shape it in cases yet to come." The following is a
proposal by the author, recommending the future direction of
products liability jurisprudence.
Products liability law involves the protection of consumers
and reflects the civility of a society. The proposed liability sys-
tem, achieved either by federal legislation or by common law
development, would hold manufacturers strictly liable, liable
without fault, for harm caused to "users, consumers, and fore-
seeable bystanders" regardless of what they knew or should
have known about product risks in long latency injuries. In such
situations, how are consumers to be protected within a legal
products liability formulation? According to Professor Madden,
the creation of what he calls a "residual domain" of strict liabil-
ity in such long latency injury settings would more adequately
protect consumers:
For products that cause long latency personal physical injuries, by
defective formulation and consequent toxicity by touch, ingestion,
inhalation, infection or radiation, excluding alcohol, tobacco and
prescriptive products, elimination of the state of the art defense or
349 CARDOZO. supra note 118, at 136-137.
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the state of scientific knowledge defense, and imposition of true
strict tort liability, would preserve the progress of section 402A
where anything less would not adequately protect injured
individuals. 3 50
To Madden's proposition, I would add prescription drug re-
lated injuries. In many long latency injury cases, including
those caused by prescription drugs, the operation of the state of
the art defense is a miscarriage of justice and cruel. 351 Drug
manufacturers are in a better position to compensate consum-
ers for unforeseeable injuries. They profit from putting drugs on
the market. Indeed, the level of responsibility of a manufacturer
in injuries due to foreseeable risks, as opposed to unforeseeable
risks, is not the same. The amount of a damage award would be
substantially lower in injuries due to unforeseeable risks, and
punitive damages would not apply.
It is true that if manufacturers were to pay out huge
awards for unforeseeable risks, this would stifle innovation. The
main cause of concern is the amount of the awards. As long as
punitive damages 352 are not recoverable in unforeseeable risk
cases, and the manufacturer was not grossly negligent, then
awards for injured consumers would be confined to prove com-
pensatory damages and the manufacturer can spread the risk
and cost more efficiently than the injured consumer. If this is
not acceptable, then a special fund353 should be established to
350 Madden, supra note 115, at 149.
351 Incorporation of Madden's "residual domain" concept would rescue courts
from confronting a situation like that in Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products
Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982), where the court had to twist and manipu-
late precedent to arrive at a just judgment. The court later confined its decision to
asbestos related injury. Although the court's decision was the morally correct one,
the unleashing of a series of cases with similar situations will undermine the logic
of the law.
352 The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) provides that "[p]unitive Damages may be
awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant's evil motive or
his reckless indifference to the rights of others." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 908(2)
Punitive damages are recovered only where the defendant's conduct was reckless,
willful or malicious. This is a heavy burden on the plaintiff to prove. Thus, punitive
damages are not routinely awarded. See, e.g., Harry Steinberg, Oh, Those Das-
tardly Trial Lawyers, N.Y. ST. B.J., Feb. 1998, at 41. (claiming that "[tihe simple
fact is that punitive damages are as rare as hen's teeth and are a virtual nonentity
in tort litigation").
353 A federal fund or even an insurance fund established by manufacturers to
compensate injured consumers for unforeseeable risks.
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compensate consumers injured by unforeseeable product risks.
In sum, consumers injured by unforeseeable product risks
should be compensated, at the least for medical expenses and
lost wages.
Only with the incorporation of such a proposal in American
products liability jurisprudence, will American products liabil-
ity reach the level of civility we think we embody. Unfortu-
nately, the Restatement (Third) does not adopt this position.
What position will the courts take? It depends. Federal legisla-
tion in products liability is gaining popularity. Thus many is-
sues of contention in the Restatement (Third) may be
preempted by Federal legislation. Most importantly, however,
the courts may choose to adopt the Restatement (Third) whole-
heartedly and they may not. There is no guarantee, and it is
unlikely that section 2 of the Restatement (Third) will receive
the wide spread adoption that its predecessor, § 402A, enjoyed.
(VI) CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT PART I (1987)
(A) Introduction
Any comparative analysis is bound to have a margin of er-
ror. This Comment does not compare absolute likes - U.S./U.K.
There are peculiar aspects of the English legal culture that will
interplay in products liability jurisprudence producing a differ-
ent result than in the U.S. For example unlike in the U.S., con-
tingency fee arrangements have only recently been permitted in
England and they have a percentage cap. 354 The judge and not
the jury, determines damage awards in English cases.3 55 Eng-
land's Consumer Protection Act does not allow punitive dam-
354 See Courts and Legal Services Act (1990 c 41) § 58 (Conditional Fee Agree-
ments), reprinted in 11 HALSBURYS STATUTES OF ENGLAND 1211. Section 58(5) pro-
vides that: "Any such order shall prescribe the maximum permitted percentage for
each description of specified proceedings." Id. In 1995 legislative order was pub-
lished providing that: "For the purpose of section 58(5) of the Courts and Legal
Services Act 1990 the maximum permitted percentage by which fees may be in-
creased in respect of each description of proceedings specified in article 2 is 100%."
Conditional Fees Agreements Regulations, 1995, S.I. 1995, Nos. 1674-75. Recently
Lord Chancellor, Lord Irvine of Lairg, the chief legal administrator in England and
Wales has proposed expanding the contingency fee system further to include all
civil cases, except family cases. See, Robert O'Connor, Blimey, What's Legal Aid
Coming To ?, 48 A.B.A.J. A.J. Feb. 1998, at 22.
355 _Qc_2 Gr.ifth_, .ciinrn, note 46. at 393 n. 158.
69
PACE INT'L L. REV. [Vol. 10:275
ages; 356 England has a National Health Care System and
extensive statutory laws, many more than in the U.S., protect-
ing consumer purchases ranging from toys to industrial equip-
ment.357 Although the evolution of products liability in both
legal cultures is not entirely parallel, the evolution is substan-
tially similar warranting the present study.
The Consumer Protection Act is statutory law. A Restate-
ment, on the other hand, is not law. It is an attempt by the ALI
to restate as closely as possible the law on a particular sub-
ject.358 The Restatement (Third) is supposed to be most repre-
sentative of American products liability in general. The CPA's
concept of defectiveness, therefore, will be compared with the
parallel Restatement (Third) sections.
For decades under English law, recovery for injury caused
by a defective product was based on negligence principles. 359 All
this changed in 1987 with the enactment 360 of the Consumer
Protection Act 1987 Part I. British products liability law was
356 [Hereinafter CPA] See infra notes 436-437 and accompanying text.
357 To name a few: The Factories Act 1961 (requires the factory employer to
provide a safe lift, if not, employer is liable for damages); The Employer Liability
(Defective Equipment) Act 1969 (if employee is injured during work due to defec-
tive equipment, he can recover damages strictly); The Defective Premises Act 1972
(requires any person carrying out work to a dwelling to see that work is done with
proper materials); Vaccine Damage Payment (although not a cause in tort, pays
money award for those who react adversely to a vaccine); Consumer Protection Act
Part II (makes it a criminal offense to supply, offer or agree to supply or expose or
possess for supply "consumer goods" which fail to comply with the "general safety
requirement"); Food Safety Act 1990 (regulation control quality, composition,
packing and labeling of food).
358 See, e.g., William A. Dreier, supra note 115, at 222. "In Putting forth a
Restatement, we as members of the ALI basically invent nothing. Rather, we at-
tempt to find a better way to describe an existing area of the law so that attorney
can advice clients, judges can charge juries, and professors can instruct students,
all with more precision. In my opinion, the proposed Restatement (Third) does not
make functional changes in the law. Rather, it makes existing law more compre-
hensible and usable." Id.
359 See 1 ROYAL COMMISSION ON CIvIL LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR PER-
SONAL INJURY, REPORT, Vol. 1, 1978, Cmnd. No. 7054-I, 1216. "The term 'prod-
ucts liability' is an American invention. It does not designate a distinct category of
law in the United Kingdom." Id. See also, Griffiths, De Val & Dormer, supra note
46, at 355 (1987) (explaining that England has no products liability law "but only
laws relating to liability for defective products").
360 On July 25, 1985, the Council of the European Communities adopted the
Directive on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Pro-
visions of the Member States concerning Liability for Defective Products. (No. 85/
374/EEC) 28 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 210) 29 (1985). The United Kingdom was
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dramatically transformed.3 61 In addition to the Strasbourg Con-
vention on Products Liability in Regard to Personal Injury and
Death,362 several U.K. Law Commission Reports363 and the Eu-
ropean Economic Community Directive 364 had recommended
that manufacturers be strictly liable for injuries caused by de-
fective products.365
(B) Who is liable under the new strict liability regime
Unlike the Restatement (Third), prescription drugs are not
governed by a separate theory of liability. Injures caused by
prescription drugs were governed by negligence, 366 and since
1987 by the CPA. The nuances of negligence based prescription
drug liability are not within the scope of the present Com-
ment.367 Prescription drugs fall within the definition of product
under the CPA,368 therefore, the discussion below applies
equally to prescription drugs.
By imposing strict liability for injuries caused by defective
products, the CPA changed decades of negligence based prod-
among the first to pass legislation (CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT PART I (1987)) to
comply with the EEC Directive.
361 CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT PART I (1987), reprinted in 39 HALSBURY'S
STATUTES OF ENGLAND 150 (4th ed. 1995 Reissue). The CPA became effective
March 1988. [hereinafter all cites to General Note are to HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF
ENGLAND General Notes].
362 In 1977 the Council of Europe's "Strasbourg Convention on Products Liabil-
ity in Regard to Personal Injury and Death" was opened for signature.
363 The Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal
Injury (the Pearson Committee) produced its report in 1976 (Cmnd. 7054). The
Law Commissions produced their report "Liability for Defective Products" in 1977
(Cmnd. 6831). For a short commentary on these Reports, see generally Gayle M.
Plummer, Products Liability in Britain, 9 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 65 (1980).
364 [Hereinafter EEC] 25 July, 1985, (No. 85/374/EEC) on the approximation of
the laws, regulations and administrative provision of the member states concern-
ing liability for defective products.
365 See General Note at 153. See also LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS,
1977, LAW COMM'N No. 82, SCOT. LAW COMM'N No. 45, Cmnd. No. 6831, at 1-3.
366 See, e.g., Vacwell Engineering v. BDH Chemicals Ltd., 3 All E.R. 1681
(1969) (a negligence drug case).
367 For a comprehensive examination of liability for prescription drug injuries
in Britain see generally PAMELA R. FERGUSON, DRUG INJURIES AND THE PURSUIT OF
COMPENSATION (1996).
368 See CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT PART I (c 43) (1987) § 2(1). Section 1(2) de-
fines a product as "any goods or electricity and . . . includes a product which is
comprised in another product, whether by virtue of being a component part or raw
materil nr ntherwise." Id.
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ucts liability. 369 Section 2(1) provides that "where any damage
is caused wholly or partly by a defect in a product, 370 every per-
son to whom subsection (2) below applies shall be liable for the
damage." Section 2(2) expands the class of defendants subject to
liability to include "the producer 371 of the product," owners of a
"trade mark or other distinguishing mark in relation to the
product[;]" and importers of products "into a member State from
a place outside the member State . . . in the course of his
business."
Section 2(3) specifically extends liability to a supplier 372 of
a defective product that caused injury. Subsection 3's extensive
expansion is meant to insure the identification of the source of a
product. 373 Liability attaches to the supplier only if the product
source has not been identified within a reasonable time.3 7 4 This
369 The CPA is intended to supplement existing tort and contract remedies.
Section 2(6) provides that "[tihis section shall be without prejudice to any liability
arising otherwise than by virtue of this part." CPA § 2(6) Unlike the CPA, the
Restatement (Third) may have the effect of prejudicing liability based on contract
and negligence theory. See § 2 cmt. n; see supra notes 107-113 and accompanying
text.
370 CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT PART I (c 43) (1987) § 2(1). Section 1(2) defines
a product as "any goods or electricity and.., includes a product which is comprised
in another product, whether by virtue of being a component part or raw material or
otherwise." Id.
371 Section 1(2) defines producer as "(a) the person who manufactured it [prod-
uct]; (b) in the case of a substance which has not been manufactured but has been
won or abstracted, the person who won or abstracted it; (c) in the case of a product
which has not been manufactured, won or abstracted but essential characteristics
of which are attributable to an industrial or other process have been carried out
(for example, in relation to agricultural produce), the person who carried out the
process." CPA § 1(2).
372 Section 46(1) of the CPA provides that supplying goods is "(a) selling, hiring
out or lending the goods (b) entering into a hire-purchase agreement to furnish the
goods; (c) the performance of any contract for work and material to furnish the
goods; (d) providing the goods in exchange for any consideration (including trading
stamps) other than money; (e) providing the goods in or in connection with the
performance of any statutory function; or (f) giving the goods as a prize or other-
wise making a gift of the goods; and, in relation to gas or water, those references
shall be continued as including references to providing the service by which the gas
or water is made available for use." CPA § 46(1).
373 See, e.g, J.R. Bradgate & Nigel Savage, The Consumer Protection Act 1987 -
II, 137 NEW L.J. 953, 953, (Oct. 9, 1987), (acknowledging that "[tihis is potentially
the most far reaching extension of liability[,]" but noting that the prime target of
the CPA is the manufacturer).
374 See CPA § 2(2). According to § 2(3), the supplier is liable for damages if the
person who suffered the damage, "within a reasonable period after the damage
occurs[,]" requests the supplier to identify "one or more of the persons" included in
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subsection extends liability "beyond the bounds of privity."3 75
With the extension of the class of defendants that are liable for
defective products, it will be easier for consumers to seek re-
dress, and most important, it insures that the injured party
would always have "an identifiable target or a means of finding
the identity of the manufacturer."376
The pro-consumer extension of the class of defendants
stopped when it reached game and agricultural farmers. Sec-
tion 2(4) provides that unless the game or agricultural product
has "undergone an industrial process[,]" 377 subsection 2 and 3
shall not apply "to a person in respect of any defect in any game
or agricultural product."378 It is not clear what exactly is an in-
dustrial process. It is believed that the British government in-
subsection 2, and "the supplier fails, within a reasonable period after receiving the
request, either to comply with the request or to identify the person who supplied
the product to him." Id. § 2(3) This change in English law is best illustrated,
although in dicta, in a recent English Court of Appeal case. In Hayes v Leo Scaf-
folding Ltd, (1996) (C.A.) (LExIs, U.K. Library, ALLCAS File), the plaintiff suffered
injury due to a defective scaffold. The plaintiff sued both his employer and the
manufacturer and recovered under negligence. The manufacturer and the em-
ployer each contributed 50% to plaintiffs award. On appeal, the manufacturer was
able to show that the employer had a duty to inspect the scaffold before allowing
plaintiff to use it. The court reversed, holding the employer liable for the entire
award; and the manufacturer effectively escaped liability. The court noted at the
outset that the employer would have had an "impregnable argument" under the
CPA. For whatever reason, it is not clear why neither the plaintiff nor the em-
ployer relied on the CPA. Under the CPA, as long as the employer identified the
manufacturer of the defective product to the plaintiff within a reasonable time, the
plaintiff would have a direct claim against the manufacturer under the new strict
liability provisions, and the employer would not have been liable for any damages.
375 Bradgate & Savage, supra note 373, at 953.
376 Bradgate & Savage, The Consumer Protection Act 1987 - Part I, 137 NEW
L.J. 929, 932, Oct. 2, 1987; see also RODNEY NELSON-JONES & PETER STEWART,
PRODUCT LIABILITY: THE NEW LAW UNDER THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 1987, §
43 (1987) (noting that subsection 3 was intended to address the problem of the
"unknown defendant[,]" that is, subsection 3 "protects the victim from anonymous
or counterfeit products" allowing the plaintiff to go "back along the chain of supply
until he ... gets back to the original source).
377 Although the term was not defined by the Act, it is believed that canning,
freezing and drying are covered.
378 During the debate on the EEC products liability directive, the issue of agri-
cultural produce was one of the main points of contention. The Directive, however,
left it to member states to extend liability to include agricultural producers or not.
The preamble to the Directive says "it is appropriate to exclude liability for agricul-
tural products and game, except where they have undergone processing of an in-
dustrial nature which could cause a defect in those products." EC Directive No. 85/
3IPCEC (19.
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cluded this exemption because: (1) other EC members chose to
include the exemption, (2) "the production of agricultural pro-
duce depends very largely on factors outside the farmer's con-
trol" and (3) the perceived difficulty of "tracing back the chain of
supply of agricultural produce."379 This provision has attracted
much criticism as being inconsistent with the public policy rea-
sons for imposing a strict products liability regime. One com-
mentator exclaimed: "[It seems anomalous to leave a person
who is made ill by eating poisonous fruit or shell fish without
redress under the Act."38 0 Given that the Sale of Goods Act
would apply to agricultural produce, 381 commentators insist
that the exemption of agricultural products make no logical
sense.38 2 With time this "misconceived" exemption will prove
unworkable and detrimental to the British consumer. 38 3
(C) Definition of defect
Like the Restatement (Third), the CPA provides that man-
ufacturers, among others,38 4 are liable for persons injured by
their defective products. Although the CPA does not explicitly
divide defect into manufacturing, design, and inadequate warn-
379 Bradgate & Savage, supra note 376, at 931.
380 Lesley Dolding, Product Liability Reform: One Step Forward, One Step
Back?, 20 BRACTON L.J. 26, 27 (1988).
381 Section 14 of the SALE OF GOODS ACT provides:
14(2): Where the seller sells goods in the course of a business, there is an
implied term that the goods supplied under the contract are of satisfac-
tory quality." The Act further defines satisfactory quality as that which "a
reasonable person would regard as satisfactory." Appropriate aspect of the
quality are, among other, the following:
(a) fitness for all the purposes for which goods of the kind in question are
commonly supplied;(b) appearance and finish; (c) freedom from minor de-
fects; (d) safety and (e) durability.
SALE OF GOODS ACT § 14 (1979 c 54) (as amended 1995), reprinted in 39 HALS-
BURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 68 (4th ed. 1995 Reissue).
382 See, e.g., Bradgate & Savage, supra note 376, at 931. "Since agricultural
produce and foodstuffs are not excluded from the ambit of the sale of Goods Act,
that objection seems to have little force." Id. In the U.S., the birthplace of modern
strict products liability, the first exception to the privity rule was foodstuff The
first product to be subject to strict liability was food. The first draft of § 402A strict
liability was limited to food. See PROSSER & WADE, supra note 41, at 707.
383 CLARK, supra note 1, at 55 (opining that "[p]roblems with misuse of fertil-
izers, pharmaceuticals and pesticides are becoming increasingly apparent and it is
suggested that time will show this exemption to have been misconceived").
384 "Manufacturer" includes all possible defendants, unless otherwise specified.
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ing or instructions defects,38 5 English case law followed a "tri-
furcated" approach to product defect.386 The CPA measures
defectiveness in terms of "safety," i.e., the risk of damage to per-
sons or property.38 7 Under the CPA a product is defective
if the safety of the product is not such as persons generally are
entitled to expect; and for those purposes 'safety', in relations to a
product, shall include safety with respect to products comprised in
that product and safety in the context of risks of damage to prop-
erty, as well as in the context of risks of death or personal
injury.38 8
Article 3(2) provides several factors to assist courts in de-
.termining what "persons generally are entitled to expect."
(a) the manner in which, and purposes for which, the product has
been marketed, its get-up [presentation], the use of any market in
relation to the product and any instructions for, or warning with
respect to, doing or refraining from doing anything with or in rela-
tion to the product; (b) what might reasonably be expected to be
done with or in relation to the product; and (c) the time when the
product was supplied by its producer to another; and nothing in
this section shall require a defect to be inferred from the fact
385 Unlike the Restatement (Third), but like § 402A, the CPA treats defect as a
single concept. Judicial interpretation of § 402A, however, classified defect into
three types. Although the judicial interpretation of defect under the CPA is yet
unknown, English case law has classified defect into manufacturing, design and
warning defects. Interestingly, the editors of HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND
(1988 4th ed.) explained in the General Notes to the CPA, that proving a manufac-
turing defect will be the easiest because of the "yardstick of comparison[,]" the
defective product will clearly "deviate from the norm of production." As to design
defect, the General Note indicated that utility factors, similar to those considered
in negligence, might be most appropriate for evaluating a design defect case. The
General Note suggested that in design defect cases, issues such as whether the
risk was known at the time of manufacture and the cost to eliminate the risk,
should be considered. In the most recent HALSBURV'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND (1995
Reissue), the editors did not include any of the above comments in the General
Notes to the CPA. Actually, there is scant commentary on the CPA in way of Gen-
eral Notes.
386 See supra Part III.
387 See General Note at 155.
388 CPA § 3. Most commentator have described article three to embody the con-
sumer expectation test. See, e.g., Alistair Clark, Legislation: The Consumer Protec-
tion Act 1987, 50 MOD. L. REV. 615, 617 (1987). Like the Restatement (Third), a
plaintiff under the CPA would need to prove that the product (i) contained a defect;
(ii) that plaintiff suffered damage; (iii) that the damage was caused by the defect;
(t-J) nd th+ fhl- defendant was in the class of liable persons. See id.
75
PACE INT'L L. REV.
alone that the safety of a product which is supplied after that time
is greater than the safety of the product in question.38 9
Consumer expectations may be influenced by many other
factors, such as, price, alternative products,390 appeal to target
market, "its safety, style, durability, versatility, efficiency,
speed, size and so on."3 91 Many commentators agree that expec-
tations should be assessed by a standard of reasonable objectiv-
ity.392 Despite the consensus regarding the objective standard
of expectations, many commentators believe that the definition
of defect under the CPA is vague and does not provide a worka-
ble standard for neither court nor manufacturer. 393
What are people entitled to expect? The Law Commission's
Report stated that there are two approaches to the concept of
defect, (1) safety and (2) merchantability. Recommending the
safety approach to defect, the Commission asserted that the "es-
sence of the definition of 'defect' should be the lack of safety."394
The remaining factors focus on the representation of the prod-
uct as determinative of peoples' expectations. Warnings, in-
structions, and the get-up 395 are relevant to consumer
expectations. Moreover, reasonable expectations include rea-
389 CPA § 3(2), reprinted in HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND (4th ed. 1995
Reissue). These factors mirror the factors recommended in the 1977 Law Commis-
sion Report, see supra, note 365.
390 See HODGES, PRODUCT LIABILITY: LAW AND INSURANCE § 2.25, at 2-8 (MARK
MILDRED ed., 1997).
391 Christopher Newdick, The Future of Negligence in Product Liability, 103
L.Q. REV. 288, 300 (1987).
392 See LAW COMMISSIONS, supra note 366, 48, at 17. "[A] product should be
regarded as defective if it does not comply with the standard of reasonable safety
that a person is entitled to expect of it; and ... the standard of safety should be
determined objectively having regard to all the circumstances in which the product
has been put into circulation, including, in particular, any instructions or warn-
ings that accompany the product when it is put into circulation, and the use or
uses to which it would be reasonable for the product to be put in these circum-
stances." Id. See also HODGES, supra note 390, § 2.23, at 2-8 "A person should not
be entitled to have expectations over and above the general level of public knowl-
edge." Id.
393 See CLARK, supra note 1, at 29-30 (stating that the main flaw of the defini-
tion of defect under the CPA is that "it fails to provide a readily ascertainable
objective standard against which a manufacturer, or indeed a court, can make the
criterion of the 'safety which persons generally are entitled to expect?'").
394 LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS, 1977, LAW COMM'N No. 82, SCOT. LAW
COMM'N No. 45, CMND. No. 6831, at 16.
395 Get-up refers to the styling, packaging and leaflets of the product. See
JONES & STEWART, supra note 376, at 49.
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sonable product use. Thus, manufacturers should take steps to
guard against misuse that can reasonably be anticipated.
396
The CPA's consumer expectation language, to a certain ex-
tent, parallels the language of § 402A comment i.397 A product
is defective when the risk of harm of a product is not such as
persons generally are entitled to expect. British commentators
have expressed dubiety regarding the effectiveness of a con-
sumer-expectations standard in complex design and warning
defects, arguing the standard in many instances can be unwork-
able.3 98 Clark contends that the consumer expectation test in
open and obvious risks would, in many instances, lead to unjust
outcomes. In complex design cases, he argues, it is difficult to
ascertain what the consumer expects, if anything. Finally, in-
jured bystanders may not have knowledge of the existence of
the product, therefore, have no expectations of safety.399 It is
presumed that "all relevant circumstances" will be considered
to determine what persons are entitled to expect. Some com-
mentators have observed that the overall approach of assessing
defect "incorporat[es] a risks/benefits element into the test of
defectiveness." 400 The circumstances to be considered will inevi-
tably include reasonableness, foreseeability, and causation 40 1 -
essentially, negligence principles. 402
396 See General Note at 155 ("[s]ub-s(2)(b), in referring to 'What might reason-
ably be expected to be done' rather than merely 'reasonable use' of the product,
imposes an obligation on a producer to consider the misuse to which his product
may be put. In such a case, however, the provisions of the Act concerned with con-
tributory negligence might come into play").
397 The Restatement (Third) explicitly rejected consumer expectations as an
independent test to determine defectiveness. See supra notes 186-210 and accom-
panying text.
398 See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 1, 35 (stressing that products today "are too
complex for a consumer to form any rational impression of the safety to be ex-
pected," especially in complex design and warning defects).
399 See CLARK, supra note 1, at 35-36.
400 FERGUSON, supra note 367, at 120.
401 Development risk raises the issue of foreseeability; the expectation of the
general consumer is another way of saying reasonable expectations.
402 See Robin H. Crockett, Pt. I of the Consumer Protection Act 1987: Civil Lia-
bility for Products, 84 L. Soc'y GAZETTE 3163, 3164 (1987) (considering the overall
environment of the product to determine safety will implicate "use of reasonable
foresight nnd the concept of causation in the tort of negligence").
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Many British commentators recommend a cost-benefit ap-
proach as the superior test,40 3 especially in design and warning
defect cases. Others argue that a cost-benefit approach will in-
quire into conduct, hence, negligence based. Under a strict lia-
bility regime, it is the product, not the conduct, which is the
focus of the inquiry. It is not possible to entertain liability with-
out fault, whilst having to consider cost and benefit factors that
circle back to the conduct of the manufacturer. 404 Dolding, for
example, confidently contends that section 3 "uses negligence-
based criteria to determine what is defective and will clearly
involve the court in a cost-benefit analysis of product safety."405
Some commentators argue that it is difficult to distinguish the
inevitable cost-benefit defect standard in the CPA from that of
negligence. 406 Newdick, for example, notes that the underlying
rationale of a risk-utility analysis involves application of "prin-
ciples most familiar to the law of negligence. ''40 7 Other commen-
tators agree that the consumer expectation test under the CPA
could be "a semantic veneer covering what is in reality a cost-
benefit test[,]" which is essentially the objective standard under
negligence. 408
How would British courts deal with a cost-benefit, or risk-
utility analysis? The risk-utility analysis in the U.S. originated
in Judge Learned Hand's opinion in United States v. Carroll
Towing Co.40 9 Judge Hand held that to determine an owner's
duty to provide against injures caused by his vessel breaking
403 See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 1, at 41 (concluding that "a cost-benefit ap-
proach seems to be a sensible way to do this"). See also Jane Stapleton, Product
Liability Reform - Real or Illusory?, CAMBRIDGE L.J. 392, 405 (1986) ("[wlhat re-
formers really mean when they say that a product meets 'expectations of safety' is
that on balance its benefits outweigh its costs .... It would have made much
greater sense simply to couch the liability criterion in terms of costs and benefits
as such and drop the concept of expectations altogether").
404 See, e.g, Newdick, supra note 391, at 300 (exclaiming whether a purported
strict liability regime is "capable of imposing liability irrespective of fault[,]" when
courts are to consider factors such as price, style, efficiency etc.).
405 Dolding, supra note 380, at 28.
406 See Newdick, supra note 391, at 301 ("[it is by no means clear, however,
how the test is to be distinguished from its present use in the law of negligence.")
See also CLARK, supra note 1, at 37 ("Indeed, any liability test short of absolute
liability could be perceived as ultimately cost-benefit approach and a consumer
expectations approach may really be one of style rather than substance").
407 Newdick, supra note 393, at 304.
408 CLARK, supra note 1, at 37.
409 159 F.2d 169 (2nd Cir. 1947).
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free from her moorings, the interplay between three variables
should be analyzed:
(1) the probability that she will break away;
(2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if she does; and
(3) the burden of adequate precautions.
Judge Learned Hand continued: "if the probability be called P;
the injury L; and the burden B; liability depends upon whether
B is less than L multiplied by P" - whether B<PL.4 1° The Re-
porters for the Restatement (Third) rely on Judge Learned
Hand's formulation when explaining risk-utility analysis.
Morris v. West Hartlepool Steam Navigation Co.4 1" is an ex-
ample of a British risk-utility formulation. Morris involved a
deckhand who fell through an open hatch and suffered injury.
After balancing the obviousness of the risk, and the serious con-
sequence of the injury, with the simple guard that would have
avoided the injury, the court held that the ship captain was
guilty of negligence for failing to erect the simple guard. Articu-
lating the cost-benefit analysis, Lord Reid held that it was the
duty of an employer
in considering whether some precaution should be taken against a
foreseeable risk, to weigh, on the one hand, the magnitude of the
risk, the likelihood of an accident happening and the possible seri-
ousness of the consequences if an accident does happen, and, on
the other hand, the difficulty and expense and any other disad-
vantage of taking the precaution. 412
Learned Hand's and Lord Reid's test are almost identical.
Like Learned Hand's burden variable, Lord Reid, articulates
the same notion of burden as expenses and other disadvantages
of adopting the safety measure. Thus, if the burden (Hand) or
the expense and disadvantage (Reid) are less than the
probability and gravity of injury (Hand) or magnitude of risk
and likelihood of consequence (Reid), then liability does not at-
tach.413 It appears that U.S. risk-utility analysis and U.K. cost-
410 Id. at 173.
411 1956 App. Cas. 552.
412 Id. at 574.
413 Lord Reid's formulation would qualify under Owen's rubric of a "micro bal-
ance." In fact, Lord Reid's formulation focuses on the cost of the alternative action,
or the alternative design that would have reduced or prevented the injury, more
.... '-t1 ,, han T.nrn d Hand's test.
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benefit analysis are quite similar. Moreover, although the CPA
speaks of strict liability, as did § 402A, courts in many cases
will rely on a cost-benefit negligence analysis of product design
and warning defects. In sum, if the CPA and its judicial inter-
pretation would hold that a person is not entitled to expect the
products to be any safer than reasonable care and skill make it,
with minor exceptions, the Act has changed little in English
law.
(D) Development risk defense
Article 4 of the CPA enumerates an elaborate list of de-
fenses.414 Many British commentators caution that the CPA's
elaborate list of defenses is inconsistent with the CPA's pro-con-
sumer policy. 4 15 Unlike the Restatement (Third), the defendant
has the burden of proving any one of these defenses.4 16 Section
4(1)(d) provides a defense if "the defect did not exist in the prod-
414 Section 6(4) of the CPA states that where the damage caused by a product
was partly the fault of the user, the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act
1945 applies. See CPA § 6(4). This act has been recently interpreted as not to re-
sult in an absolute bar of recovery. See Pitt v. Hunt, 3 All E.R. 344 (1990). Compare
§ 17(a) & (b) of the Restatement (Third):
(a) A plaintiffs recovery of damages for harm caused by a product defect
may be reduced if the conduct of the plaintiff combines with the product
defect to cause the harm and the plaintiffs conduct fails to conform to
generally applicable rules establishing appropriate standard of care.
(b) The manner and extent of the reduction under Subsection (a) and the
apportionment of plaintiffs recovery among multiple defendants are gov-
erned by generally applicable rules of apportioning responsibility.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 17.
415 See THE PEARSON COMMISSION REPORT 7054, 1259 (1978) (stressing that
"to exclude development risks from a regime of strict liability would be to leave a
gap in the compensation cover through which, for example, the victims of another
Thalidomide disaster might easily slip") (quoted in Alistair Clark, supra note 388,
at 619); see also JONES & STEWART, supra note 376, at 78 (noting that there is a
total of sixteen defenses under the CPA, "[this abundance demonstrates that Part
I has not imposed absolute products liability"); see also Dolding, supra note 380, at
30 (lamenting "it is difficult to see what benefit a plaintiff could derive from the
inclusion in the Act of the controversial 'development risks'.., defense"). Dolding
correctly observes that the Thalidomide crisis in the 1970's that resulted in hun-
dreds of deformed children was the catalyst to the strict liability movement in the
U.K. As such, the inclusion of the 'development risk' defense would relieve the
manufacturer of Thalidomide from liability and becomes an effective obstacle to
plaintiffs to recover in drug side effect cases. Id. at 30.
416 Section 4 of the CPA states that in any civil suit "against any person in
respect of a defect in a product it shall be a defense from him to show -.... " CPA §
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uct at the relevant time." Relevant time is defined as the "time
when" the manufacturer "supplied the product to another."417
The defense under the CPA that is relevant to the present
study,418 is the "state of scientific and technical knowledge" de-
fense4 9 which provides:
that the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the relevant
time was not such that a producer of products of the same descrip-
tion as the product in question might be expected to have discov-
ered the defect if it had existed in his products while they were
under his control. 4
20
The enactment of the CPA was an attempt to harmonize
English products liability law in accord with a 1985 EEC prod-
ucts liability directive.421 The EEC directive gave member
States the option of including the state of scientific knowledge
defense in their national products liability law.4 22 The British
government chose to include the state of scientific knowledge
defense in the CPA for several alleged reasons. First, innova-
417 CPA § 4(2)(a).
418 Products liability defenses are not within the scope of this Comment. Under
the Restatement (Third), the "state-of-the-art" concept is inextricably linked to the
concept of defect. Under the CPA, the "state of the art" is treated as an affirmative
defense. For the purposes of this study, therefore, "state-of-the-art" or state of sci-
entific knowledge defense will be the only defense examined closely.
419 This defense was controversial during debates on the EEC products liabil-
ity Directive.
420 CPA § 4(1)(e) (1987). Compare § 7(e) of the ECC Directive § 7(e) which pro-
vides, in pertinent part, " that the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the
time when he put the product into circulation was not such as to enable the exist-
ence of the defect to be discovered." No. 85/374/EEC. The ECC Directive provides
that if there is any knowledge anywhere that the defect could have been discovered
at the time the product was put into circulation the defense fails. Unlike the ECC,
the CPA indicates that the defense is sustained if the producer could not reason-
ably be expected to have discovered the defect in light of scientific knowledge.
Many commentaries have criticized the CPA's manipulation of 7(e) on the grounds
that it reduced the defense to a variant of negligence and thus England failed to
properly implement § 7(e). But see, Christopher Newdick, The Development Risk
Defense of the Consumer Protection Act 1987, 47 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 455 (1988) (argu-
ing that the CPA correctly interpreted article 7(e) of the EEC Product Liability
Directive). Recently, the Court of Justice of the European Communities held that
the CPA's Development Risk defense was in accord with the 1985 Directive. See
European Commission v. United Kingdom, 1997 All E.R. (EC) 481.
421 See supra note 361.
422 See GERAINT HOWELLS & THOMAS WILHESLMSSON, EC CONSUMER LAW 41
(1997) ("Member States were free to exclude the defense, but we have seen that
Lew cbna tn dn so").
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tion would be inhibited without a state-of-the-art defense. Sec-
ond insurance costs might increase, and third that the U.K.
would be put at a competitive disadvantage, given that many
European countries have this defense. 423 The focus in a strict
liability regime should be on the defectiveness of the product
rather than on the conduct of the manufacturer, thus unforesee-
ability of the defect would seem irrelevant. By incorporating the
state of scientific knowledge defense, in essence a foreseeability
inquiry, a drug manufacturer can escape liability under the
CPA, if he shows that he was not expected to have known about
a certain defect or side effect at the time of manufacture. 424
Strictly speaking, a development risk defense and strict liability
are a contradiction in terms. Many commentators have demon-
strated that none of the underlying policy considerations of
strict liability425 are advanced by the adoption of the develop-
ment risk defense. 426 Like the Restatement (Third), if a pro-
ducer was not negligent in failing to discover the defect, he is
not liable. 427 By implicating concepts such as foreseeability and
423 See Bradgate & Savage, The Consumer Protection Act 1987 - IV 137 NEW
L.J., Nov. 6, 1987, at 1049, 1049. But see LAW COMMISSION, supra note 365, at 19-
20 (refuting the above argument and recommending strict liability in prescription
drugs even if the producer was not negligent); for a general discussion regarding
innovation, insurance, trial process, risk spreading arguments, see CLARK, supra
note 1, at 180-182.
424 See CLARK, supra note 1, at 193.
425 For a general discussion of policy considerations favoring strict liability, see
LAw COMMISSION, supra note 365, at 6-7 (e.g., risk spreading; manufacturer in bet-
ter position; manufacture can insure).
426 See CLARK, supra note 1, at 183 (concluding, after citing the policy consider-
ation for a strict liability regime, "[uit is difficult to see how the inclusion of a devel-
opment risks defense furthers any of these aims," and that "each could be taken to
support the exclusion of the defense"); see also Aubrey L. Diamond, New Trends In
Product Liability Legislation In The United Kingdom: The Consumer Protection
Act, 16 J. OF LEGIS. 15, 25 (1989) (referring to the policy consideration holding that
the manufacturer is in a better position to insure against injuries caused by his
product's defect, concluding that "the arguments for narrowing the operation of the
state of the art defense seem strong").
427 The CPA's position is contrary to the 1977 Law Commission recommenda-
tion that all products including prescription drugs should be subject to strict liabil-
ity. The Commission rejected the claim that prescription drugs are unique and
deserve special treatment, insisting that the underlying policy considerations
favoring strict liability for injury caused by defective product, equally apply in the
case of prescription drugs. Referring to the Thalidomide disaster, the Law Com-
missions stated: 'The producer of defective pharmaceuticals creates the risk; he is
the person best able to control the quality of the product; he is the person best able
to insure against claims; and public expectation that drugs on the market will be
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reasonableness, the state-of-the-art defense returns products li-
ability to a negligence standard. 428 The Restatement (Third),
like the CPA, holds manufactures liable to "risks of harm that
are reasonably foreseeable at the time of the sale."429 Unlike the
CPA, the development risk defense under the Restatement
(Third) is not a defense, but part of the definition of defective-
ness. Many British commentators eschew that the concept of
"development risk" goes to the essence of the concept of defect.
That is, the development risk includes industry customs and
whether a feasible, safer alternative design was available at the
time of sale. Thus, development risk should be part of the defi-
nition of defect rather than a defense.4 30
The CPA, albeit slightly, improves the consumers' chances
of bringing claims in products liability. The main improvement
for the U.K. consumer is the increase of possible targets for a
claim.431 The CPA will make recovery easier for plaintiffs, but it
is hardly a revolution in products liability jurisprudence. In
fact, in some cases plaintiffs have better chances of recovery
under the old law than under the CPA.432 Many commentators,
correctly believe that the CPA will not depart from the law of
negligence, while others believe that proving that a product is
safe is raised by advertising and by the promotional material with which the phar-
maceutical industry supply the medical profession." LAw COMMISSION, supra note
368, at 19-22
428 See JONES & STEWART, supra note 376, at 68 ("[slo far as discovery of a
defect is concerned, s.4(1)(e) effectively preserves the principles of negligence law.
Only the onus of proof is different"); see also Bradgate & Savage, supra note 423, at
1050 ("[t]he existence of the development risks defen[s]e open up a serious loophole
in the protection afforded by the Act, and the wording of the defen[s]e, coupled
with the reference in the definition of 'defect' to what 'persons generally are enti-
tled to expect' seems uncomfortably similar to the language of negligence"). See
also CLARK, supra note 1, 155; Newdick, supra note 391, at 293-297 (asserting that
with the exception of the burden of proof, the state-of-the-art defense maintain a
negligence standard).
429 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 8 cmt. g. The Reporters contend that "[i]mposing
liability for unforeseeable risks can create inappropriate disincentives for the de-
velopment of new drugs and therapeutic devices." Id.
430 See CLARK, supra note 1, at 184-185.
431 See Bradgate & Nigel, supra note 423, at 1050 (predicting that "by increas-
ing the number of possible targets for a claim, the Act will increase the protection
of consumer").
432 See Diamond, supra note 426, at 25 (concluding that "producer's liability
under the 1987 Act will in some cases be a lesser liability than is imposed upon
sellers by the earlier law - the Sale of Goods Act - and, accordingly, the most seri-
,us nf fhp nsnomalies remains").
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defective is just as difficult as proving negligence in tort.433
With the exception of two cases that mention the CPA in pass-
ing,434 the Act has not produced any case law.435 It becomes
clear from the foregoing discussion that the CPA may not have
departed much from current negligence law. Commenting on
the CPA, Clark put it succinctly "the spirit of the reasonable
man has not been fully exorcised."436 In the final analysis, Eng-
lish courts, with the exception in manufacturing defect cases,
will adopt a risk-utility analysis in design and warning cases,
though couched in strict liability terminology.
433 See FERGUSON, supra note 368, at 122 (lamenting that "the need to estab-
lish that a product was defective may be as much a hurdle for the plaintiff under
the strict liability regime as the requirement to prove negligence under tort law").
434 See AB v. South West Water Services Ltd., 1 All E.R. 609 (1993); and,
Hayes v. Leo Scaffolding Ltd, Court of Appeal (Civil Division 1996) (LEXIS, U.K.
Library, ALLCAS File). AB South is primarily a punitive damages case. The AB
South court held that punitive damages are not recoverable in products liability
actions brought under the CPA. The court announced a test that allows punitive
damages only in causes of action where punitive damages were awarded prior to
1964. See 1 All E.R. (1993), at 620. Applying this test to the present case, the court
found that "[t]he statutory duty relied upon in this case is created by the Con-
sumer Protection Act 1987 and the Water Act 1945; in the former case there could
not have been, and in the latter case there was not, an award of exemplary dam-
ages before 1964." Id. In the second case, Hayes v. Leo Scaffolding, supra, plaintiff
was injured when, a defective scaffold he was standing on broke. The plaintiff
brought a claim in negligence against his employer and manufacture. He recovered
damages. The court then apportioned plaintiffs award, half on employer and half
on manufacture. The manufacturer appealed. The court allowed the appeal on the
basis that the employer had a duty to inspect the scaffold before giving the scaffold
to plaintiff. The Court of Appeal noted that plaintiff and employer would have had
an impregnable case under the CPA. But they did not plead under the CPA. The
reason is not clear.
435 See, e.g., The ALL ENGLAND LAw Reports Annual Review (1993), at 91 ("AB
v. South was primarily concerned with the circumstances in which exemplary
damages might be awarded. Although the point was really noted only in passing, it
also appears to be the first case on the products liability provisions of the Con-
sumer Protection Act (1987) to be reported in the All English Reports"). This can
be explained by the fact that many products liability causes of action continue to be
borough under statutory violations or under implied warranties. For a list of prod-
uct related statutes see supra note 55. See also CLARK, supra note 1, at 24 ("[a]
further uncertainty is that many product-related accidents involving injury occur
at the workplace. Most of these will trigger liability under statutes such as the
Factories Acts or the Employers' Liability (Defective Equipment) Act 1969, and it
is not expected that injured employees will pursue the producer under the new
Act").
436 CLARK, supra note 1, at 21.
84http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol10/iss1/11
1998] NEGLIGENCE IS BACK WITH A VENGEANCE 359
(VII) CONCLUSION
The foregoing comparison between the Restatement (Third)
and the Consumer Protection Act attempted, through a compar-
ative textual analysis, to shed some light on the differences be-
tween both systems. As we have seen in part I of the paper,
products liability in England was essentially negligence based.
There was no comparable evolution of case law toward strict lia-
bility as there was in the United States. However, English pol-
icy trends encouraged a movement toward a United States
version of strict liability. Ironically, the evolution of United
States products liability indicates a retreat from strict liability
and a return to a negligence-based conceptualization of prod-
ucts liability.
Finally, in the absence of judicial interpretation of the
CPA,437 one can not be certain of the direction U.K. products
liability will take in the future. In addition to the development
risk defense and hints of cost-benefit analysis, it is extremely
likely that judicial interpretation of the CPA will move toward
the Restatement (Third). That is, a strong negligence basis for
products liability couched in strict liability terminology or strict
liability linguistics.
Abed Awadt
437 See CLARK, supra note 1, at 45 (noting that the 'strictness' of the new CPA
standard "will depend partly upon how the courts address the problem").
t B.A. Saint Peter's College, 1991; M.A. School of Oriental & African Studies,
University of London, 1995; J.D. Pace University School of Law, 1998. The author
dedicates this Comment to his parents, Ahmad and Mary Awad, for their encour-
agement and unconditional love. The author also wishes to thank his wife, Doro-
thy, and son, Ahmad, for their love and constant source of inspiration, without
which this Comment would not have come to fruition. Finally, the author would
like to thank Professor Stuart M. Madden and Professor Eric E. Bergsten for their
i . cm -nto ln e-r r1rafts.
85
